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Mestizos have lived on Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast since at least 1894 and been 
the majority group since at least 1981. However, Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast is 
frequently imagined as a predominantly black and indigenous space. As renewed interest 
in mega-development projects, such as the trans-oceanic canal, bring attention to 
Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast, questions about the autonomy of Afro-descendant and 
indigenous communities are raised once again. Moreover, as mestizos continue to 
migrate from the Pacific and central regions of the country towards the Caribbean coast 
territories, violence has escalated as they attempt to claim lands that have been 
constitutionally recognized as collectively owned by Afro-descendant and indigenous 
communities of the Caribbean coast territories. Recently, mestizos on the Caribbean coast 
have begun to express a racial identity, as “mestizos costeños.” This thesis explores the 
emergence of this racial articulation by drawing on Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation to 
analyze the discourses produced about mestizo costeño history and identity in Bluefields, 
Nicaragua. Using in-depth interviews and participant observation, this thesis examines 
the discursive elements that mestizos costeños link together to produce these discourses. 
The thesis argues that to understand how mestizos costeños fit into regional and national 
 viii 
politics, we must explore the political work that the discursive linkages do in the 
articulations they produce. To that end, this thesis examines these articulations and 
situates them in the context of local, regional, and national politics to gain a broader 
understanding of the implications of the discourse of mestizo costeño identity for racial 
politics in Bluefields and the Caribbean coast. The thesis concludes by examining what 
the case of mestizos costeños in Bluefields has to offer towards understanding the 
contributions of identity politics to liberalism by considering the ideas of Charles Mills 
and Creole community leaders from Bluefields. 
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Chapter 1:  Mestizos Costeños and Historical Geographies of Race in 
Nicaragua 
Mestizo Disruptions in Bluefields, Nicaragua  
In January 2010, mestizo campesinos marched through the streets of Bluefields, 
Nicaragua, a port city located on the country’s southern Caribbean coast. These protestors 
claimed that land belonging to over 600 mestizo campesinos was part of the territory that 
had recently been titled to Bluefields and the Rama and Kriole territories under Law 445, 
which granted indigenous and Afro-Caribbean ethnic groups on Nicaragua’s Caribbean 
coast the right to title their lands. According to Courtney Morris’ ethnographic 
observations, these mestizo campesinos came from a community near Kukra River, 
located just south of Bluefields. (Morris 2016) When asked about the protest and their 
interpretation of the racialized politics of land tenure, one mestizo marcher responded 
that “We are being discriminated as Mestizos. They discriminate against us as Mestizos.” 
(Morris 2016)  
Morris subsequently found out that this protest march was “organized” by a 
mestizo representative of the regional council that paid protestors to march and provided 
the transportation from the Kukra River area to Bluefields. (Morris 2012, 238) Fabricated 
origins of the protest notwithstanding, Morris notes that the complaints and aggrieved 
tenor of the march felt real. Six years later, during my own opportunity to hear mestizos 
in Bluefields, I came across similar narratives of discrimination, and specifically 
discrimination against mestizos costeños. But who are mestizos costeños? And if the 
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protest was to some extent manufactured by a politician and not from community of 
mobilization, what were the complaints and grievances really about?  
I begin my thesis by noting some of the ways in which mestizos have disrupted 
daily life in Bluefields. In an immediate sense, the opening anecdote illustrates a spatial 
disruption: by filling a street that was otherwise relatively quiet, mestizos disrupted the 
organization of space in daily life in this section of town. During my own conversations 
with costeños of various racial backgrounds, I also learned about how mestizos were 
squatting on lands and taking control of farms and other collectively held plots of land. In 
this sense, then, the marches also reflected a broader pattern in which mestizos have 
disrupted the existing land tenure system by taking often violent and extralegal control of 
the land.  
Much of the literature on Nicaragua’s Caribbean Coast has focused on the 
experience of Afro-descendant and indigenous costeños. This focus has allowed scholars 
to examine how indigenous and Afro-descendant racial identities have been formed there 
(and to what ends), how indigenous communities have negotiated foreign intervention, 
how multicultural models of ethnic rights have failed to secure the rights it sets out to 
protect, and how Afro-Nicaraguans navigate multiple forms of state violence. (See Goett 
2017; Gordon 1998; Hale 1994; Hooker 2005b; Hooker 2009; Hooker 2010; Morris 
2016.) While these works have acknowledged mestizo presence on Nicaragua’s 
Caribbean coast, very little scholarly attention has focused on their role or impact on the 
coast, which is striking given that mestizos have comprised the majority group on the 
coast since 1981. A relatively larger body of work exists that examines the experiences of 
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Nicaraguan mestizos outside of the Caribbean coast territories. However, as Morris 
insightfully points out, this larger body of work is characterized by a pattern of treating 
the Caribbean coast region as “peripheral to the nation’s political history when, in fact, it 
has served as a key site of state driven projects for national development.” (Morris 2013, 
150. For important and useful exceptions see Gould 1998; Hooker 2005a.)  Further, this 
body of work generally treats mestizos as racially unmarked bodies, foreclosing an 
interrogation of how race structures their social and political projects. To this point, 
Morris crucially reminds us that “one need not focus on the Coast to study the role of 
race in national political formations.” Likewise, one need not focus on racially oppressed 
populations to study how race and power are bound up in political projects. This lack of 
scholarly attention to how mestizos (re)produce, protect and mobilize racial power in a 
country that so distinctly presents itself as a mestizo nation calls into question the extent 
to which we can claim to have a full understanding of national and political projects in 
Nicaragua.  
This thesis responds to this silence by examining how mestizos construct 
narratives of racial identity in Caribbean coast city of Bluefields, Nicaragua. By building 
on the work of previous Nicaraguanists that have mapped out the racial dynamics of the 
Caribbean coast, I show how mestizos in Bluefields have produced a third kind of 
disruption. If the largest racial groups on Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast were Afro-
Caribbean and indigenous until 1981, then the shift to a mestizo majority signals a 
demographic disruption, which presumably brings with it a set of related political 
consequences. This shifting demographic dynamic is what generates the questions I 
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explore in this thesis: Who are mestizos costeños? How do they engage with other 
groups? What do they make of regional autonomy and the attendant racial politics of the 
region? To understand the context in which these questions have emerged, the rest of this 
chapter sketches out a historical geography of race in Nicaragua to examine how race, 
space and power have been mutually imbricated throughout Nicaraguan history. This 
analytical method allows me to emphasize the ways in which mestizo racial power has 
been related to politics of land and territory while strategically engaging a politics of 
silence in the production of historical narratives of Nicaragua. 
Historical Geographies of Race in Nicaragua 
As Courtney Morris points out, much of the scholarship on Nicaragua has focused 
on mestizos while not examining their relationship to racial projects. Since this thesis sets 
out to ask how mestizos costeños in Bluefields construct this racial articulation, it is 
important to understand the context in which these articulations take place. In “Race and 
the Space of Citizenship,” Juliet Hooker demonstrates how race and space were co-
constitutive processes that delineated the boundaries of citizenship. (Hooker 2010) In 
sketching a brief historical geography of race in Nicaragua, I extend this analysis by 
paying attention to three examples in which mestizo racial power was spatialized while 
simultaneously producing the conditions that led to mestizo migration from Nicaragua’s 
Pacific and central regions to the autonomous Caribbean coast territories.  
The first moment I present is the military annexation of the Caribbean coast 
region into the Nicaraguan national territory in 1894. Through forced military 
incorporation, the early mestizo nation-state established its commitment to using violence 
as a means of enforcing racial hierarchies in the service of nation-building projects. The 
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second instance I discuss is the coffee and cotton boom of the mid-20th century. During 
the mid-twentieth century, Nicaragua engaged the world economic market through an 
increasingly monopolistic strategy of agricultural exports, largely (though not 
exclusively) cotton and coffee. The process by which this economic enterprise took shape 
resulted in the displacement of mestizo campesinos from the Pacific and central regions, 
after which they were encouraged to consider the agricultural frontier as a possibility for 
economic renewal. This second example illustrates an instance of what Rob Nixon 
theorizes as “slow violence.” (Nixon 2011) Though the economic practices of this period 
did not resemble the immediate and spectacular violence of the annexation, they are 
crucial towards understanding how the Caribbean coast and its Afro-descendant and 
indigenous communities are imagined as disposable and exploitable resources of the 
Nicaraguan nation-state while mestizo bodies remain central concerns of the state. 
Through this example, I show how mestizo political elites begin to develop the political 
and economic conditions from which mestizo migration and displacement emerged. The 
third and final example I present explores the development of what Hooker terms 
“mestizo multiculturalism” in the 1990s. Following the Sandinista Revolution and 
subsequent Contra War, the Nicaraguan government negotiated with the Caribbean coast 
territories to produce a system of regional autonomy. Here, I discuss how this model of 
multiculturalism was presented as a model of ethnic rights while not fundamentally 
reorganizing the racialized distribution of power in Nicaragua and, instead, preserving the 
existing racial hierarchy. 
During the establishment of the Nicaraguan nation-state, the Caribbean coast 
territories were a spatial representation of the racial anxieties that political elites felt in 
Nicaragua’s first years. Unlike the rest of the Nicaraguan national territory, the Caribbean 
coast region (then known as the Mosquito Kingdom) had never been under Spanish 
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colonial rule. Instead, the Mosquito Kingdom functioned as a British protectorate, 
following a colonial trajectory distinct from the Pacific and central regions of the country 
that had previously been controlled by Spain. While the Pacific and central regions of 
Nicaragua had more (but not exclusively) mestizo populations, the Caribbean coast was 
still largely populated by racially-mixed Afro-descendant and Amerindian groups under 
different colonial powers.  
In “Race and the Space of Citizenship,” Hooker demonstrates how the racial and 
colonial positions of costeños were central preoccupations of political elites in the late 
19th century. (Hooker 2010) Mestizo political elites in the emerging nation discovered 
that affiliating with the Afro-descendant and indigenous populations of the Mosquito 
Kingdom challenged the extent to which European governments were willing to grant 
Nicaragua some semblance of privilege vis-a-vis whiteness. In one particularly 
illuminating example, Hooker reminds us that when Nicaragua sought support from 
France in efforts to challenge the British over the Mosquito Kingdom, France’s response 
was that “European nations cannot, without demeaning themselves negotiate with those 
little Mosquitian governments.” (253) Thus, not only did the French contribute to a 
racialization of Afro-descendant and indigenous populations as “savage” and inferior, but 
their reaction made it evident that other nations were responding to the way in which 
Nicaragua decided to articulate itself, in this case by responding to how the nascent 
Nicaraguan nation engaged with the non-white populations of the Caribbean coast. By 
appealing to the prevailing ideologies and logics of anti-black and anti-indigenous racism 
to gain favor in the international sphere, mestizo Nicaraguan political elites aligned 
themselves with a racial hierarchy that persists to this day. Additionally, this early 
oppositional dynamic between mestizo political elites in the Pacific and Afro-descendant 
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and indigenous communities on the Caribbean coast, was one that has also survived in 
various ways.  
The nature of the opposition is comprised of a potential for Afro-descendant and 
indigenous political autonomy that would preclude mestizo elites’ historic commitment to 
military intervention and economic extractivist policies in service of official mestizo 
nationalism. However, the early discourse of a “civilized,” mestizo nation-state and a 
“savage” Afro-descendant and indigenous Caribbean coast region has also survived, 
remarkably intact in spite of few modifications. Through the military annexation, mestizo 
political elites in Nicaragua sought to delegitimize Afro-descendant and indigenous 
political autonomy in the Caribbean coast territories. One of the ways in which 
Nicaraguan political elites justified excluding costeños from citizenship is by drawing 
from this racist ideology that Afro-descendants and indigenous people were inferiorm. 
Indeed, Nicaraguan political elites imagined the Mosquito Kingdom as “savage” and 
taken over by “Jamaican Negroes,” despite the fact that Creole and Miskitu communities 
had been established long before the development of a Nicaraguan nation. (Hooker 2010; 
Gordon 1998)  
The annexation of the Caribbean coast is an essential starting point in 
understanding how race and space have been mutually constitutive elements in 
Nicaraguan history.  What I wish to emphasize here is that while much of the discourse 
sets out to establish an imagined inherent inferiority of black and indigenous populations 
on the coast, it simultaneously seeks to establish the legitimacy of mestizo political 
dominance in the emerging Nicaraguan nation-state. As a strategy of nation-building, this 
discourse inscribed citizenship within the mestizo criollo populace while excluding black 
and indigenous communities from the Nicaraguan national imaginary. This discourse also 
contributes towards two additional political tasks: 1) it foreclosed the possibility of racial 
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solidarity and 2) established the racialized politics of land control as a central 
preoccupation in Nicaraguan nation-building projects. By choosing to go forward with 
the military annexation of the Caribbean coast, political elites chose to appeal to anti-
black and anti-indigenous ideas of racialized inferiority and an inability for self-
governance. In doing so, mestizo elites rejected any early potential of challenging the 
racialized logics of violence that European colonial projects developed throughout Latin 
America and, more specifically, in the emergent Nicaraguan society. Further, in refusing 
to acknowledge the political agency of black and indigenous communities in the 
Mosquito Kingdom, mestizo elites took power and control over the territory of the 
Mosquito Kingdom in line with what geographer Sharlene Mollett reminds us is a 
colonial legacy of land-grabbing. (Mollett 2016) This annexation is one of the first times, 
if not the first, that mestizos in Nicaragua produce racialized power through a violent 
politics of land control. The political elites of the time point to specifically racialized 
narratives to justify the annexation and the political exclusion of black and indigenous 
costeños. In this way, then, mestizo disruption of black and indigenous governance and 
land tenure on the coast dates as far back to at least 1894. As an initial moment for this 
historical geography of race, we see how mestizo political elites used race as a discursive 
tool to justify the violent, forced annexation of the coast territories and the subsequent 
political exclusion of costeños from the Nicaraguan nation. Indeed, as Hooker observes, 
this moment is especially instructive in that it reveals the extent to which preoccupations 
about race have shaped the mestizos’ politics in Nicaragua. (Hooker 2010) 
 In the decades that followed, political elites would go on to develop various 
forms of official mestizo nationalisms that consistently reinscribed mestizos as the 
citizens of the Nicaraguan nation-state while employing various strategies to erase or 
otherwise marginalize black and indigenous communities in Nicaragua. (Hooker 2005a) 
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However, in the mid-twentieth century mestizo campesinos’ livelihoods would be 
disrupted as capitalism in Nicaragua was remodeled to align itself with worldwide shifts 
in economic and social structures after World War II. The way in which capitalism was 
re-articulated in Nicaragua during the 1950s and 1960s is important in understanding how 
mestizo racial power was shaped because of the differential impacts it had on different 
groups of mestizo Nicaraguans. As such, in this next example I choose to analyze and 
discuss this moment to bring into sharp relief how economic disenfranchisement took 
form for many mestizos throughout the country, creating the conditions for them to move 
eastward into black and indigenous communities in the so-called agricultural frontier and 
the Caribbean coast territories. I suggest that Rob Nixon’s notion of “slow violence” is a 
useful way of understanding how this reformulation of capitalistic practices in Nicaragua 
is also centrally about reformulating how mestizo political elites operationalized race 
during this period. 
In Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Rob Nixon offers a new 
way to conceptualize violence. Nixon argues that immediate, spectacular, visible forms of 
violence predominate our understandings of violence while other slower, less visible, yet 
insidious and pervasive forms of violence remain unnoticed and understudied. (Nixon 
2011) Nixon explores how writers have made slow violence visible across various genres 
and to multiple audiences. Although Nixon’s discussion is rooted in the example of the 
biological consequences of environmental toxic agents, the concept of slow violence 
helps us see the linkages between agricultural reforms and racialized state practices of 
surveillance and policing of black communities throughout Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast. 
Indeed, in Black Autonomy, Jennifer Goett shows how the elision of slow violence 
generates a paradox in which scholars and journalists consistently point to Nicaragua as 
regionally exceptional.  
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When it comes to violence, Nicaragua is often held up to be an exception in 
Central America in contrast to the higher homicide rates of the so-called Northern 
Triangle comprised of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. When it comes to poverty, 
Nicaragua is often ranked second only to Haiti in the Western Hemisphere. However, 
Goett shows how these claims gloss over very important variations within Nicaragua that 
homogenize perceptions of violence and poverty, obscuring the ways in which they are 
organized along racial and regional lines. Goett’s book centers on one site in which these 
variations are painfully visible by documenting and theorizing the activism of black 
Creole communities in the Monkey Point community in Nicaragua’s Southern Caribbean 
coast. To understand the development of policing and state violence in Monkey Point, 
Goett shows how it is essential to also examine the rhetoric of drug enforcement and 
national security policies produced by the mestizo Nicaraguan nation-state. Goett’s work 
clearly traces how the state’s rhetoric and strategies of public safety, economic prosperity 
and international cooperation in the infamous war on drugs always come at the expense 
of black and indigenous costeños or are otherwise not inclusive of how these goals would 
translate in their context. In the following example, my goal is to show how the existing 
literature on mestizo campesinos in Nicaragua provide the empirical observations of the 
deepening economic and political cleavages between mestizo campesinos and mestizo 
elites. I suggest that these economic and agricultural policies were forms of slow violence 
that complicate our understanding of racially organized patterns of poverty and violence 
in Nicaragua. 
Various scholars have studied the ways in which processes of globalization 
played out in Nicaragua and more broadly throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. 
My discussion of this historical moment in Nicaragua builds on these works by focusing 
on how race and space were re-articulated during this time. In Transnational Conflicts, 
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sociologist William Robinson provides an in-depth analysis of how trends in 
globalization changed how capital, labor, and politics were organized in Central America 
during the second half of the 20th century. He proposes thinking about capitalist 
expansion in Central America as occurring in four waves: 1) mercantile capitalism from 
the 1520s-mid-1800s, 2) classical/competitive capitalism from the 1870s-1930s, 3) 
corporate/monopoly capitalism from the 1940s-1970s, and 4) global capitalism from the 
1980s-present. (Robinson 2003, 155) Robinson’s argument is primarily concerned with 
the third wave of capitalist expansion in Central America, which he names as 
corporate/monopoly capitalism and occurring from the 1940s to the 1970s. Robinson 
characterizes this wave as primarily characterized with the production of beef, sugar, and 
cotton as exports and dominated by a coffee oligarchy, capitalist planters, and a 
“financial, industrial and commercial” elite. Throughout this time period, one key feature 
of mestizo campesinos’ livelihoods was their dependence on land-owning elites as 
employers and seasonal sources of income.  
In To Lead As Equals, historian Jeffrey Gould traces the development of political 
consciousness among rural campesinos between 1929 and 1979 in Chinandega, a 
department in Nicaragua’s northwest Pacific region. In this account, Gould traces the 
development of political consciousness of rural campesinos as they engage with and 
make sense of how political and land-owning elites consistently limited the economic 
opportunities available to them as campesinos. While Gould’s focus is on highlighting 
the development of a collective group identity and community-oriented politics, this 
study is useful to the present discussion in at least two ways. First, it shows how race 
remains largely unacknowledged for mestizos. Second, it carefully delineates the 
economic and political forces that led to the displacement of campesinos not only in the 
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Northwest Pacific department of Chinandega but throughout the rest of the rural Pacific 
and central regions of Nicaragua.  
Gould’s discussion focuses on self-identified campesinos. Early on, Gould admits 
his hesitation to use “rural proletarian” or “peasants” as analytical categories through 
which to understand the people he wrote about in Chinandega because although the terms 
were more popular in the historical and anthropological literature, they failed to 
adequately capture the dynamic he observed. Instead, he notes that the people he wrote 
about used the term “campesino” far more commonly. It’s notable that throughout the 
book, the most substantial discussion of race comes when describing the sexual violence 
that elite and working-class men inflicted on indigenous women, producing a generation 
of mestizo children that were not recognized by campesino communities in Chinandega 
but were welcomed by Indians in Sutiavas. Otherwise, the campesinos that Gould writes 
about present themselves as racially unmarked, instead focusing on their financial 
disenfranchisement. Likewise, Gould follows suit and instead directs his analysis towards 
a discussion of how political consciousness was developed along class lines, producing a 
cleavage between the mestizo Nicaragua elites and rural campesinos in Chinandega. 
This silence on racial identity reproduces the “unmarked” racial position of 
mestizos which naturalizes their centrality in Nicaraguan politics and misses the 
opportunity to complicate the way that race is multivalent and, among other ways, shaped 
by class position. However, Gould’s account of campesinos in Chinandega does trace 
how mestizo campesinos were displaced through an economic system of agricultural 
exportation that increasingly left campesinos without land, credit or state services upon 
which to lean for support. (Gould 1990; Robinson 2003) While the mechanisms through 
which individual mestizo campesinos and their families arrived at displacement may 
vary, the structural picture that Robinson paints helps illustrate the broader context in 
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which Gould’s ethnographic narratives occur. In examining how monopoly capitalism 
between the 1940s and 1970s played out in Nicaragua, these analyses reveal that the 
Nicaraguan state consistently identified itself as a mestizo nation while simultaneously 
disavowing its growing population of increasingly landless and cash-poor mestizo 
campesinos. Thus, these middle decades of the 20th century are a period in which the 
order of race and space in Nicaragua is complicated for mestizos because mestizos 
campesinos can no longer live or work the way they had for decades. Instead, they were 
forced to sell whatever land they had and search elsewhere for a way to establish their 
livelihoods, oftentimes turning to the Caribbean coast in search of these possibilities.  
At the same time, the state officials and political and economic elites that 
committed Nicaragua to a practice of monopoly capitalism that led to the 
abovementioned displacement were also mestizos. Insofar as we can understand how race 
and space are imbricated in Nicaragua, it is important to note here that mestizo 
campesinos were economically disenfranchised while remaining legitimate subjects of 
concern within the Nicaraguan political imaginary, unlike black and indigenous costeños 
who were either erased, silenced or imagined as existing in the past (or stuck in the past). 
(Hooker 2005a) The fact that mestizo campesinos remain politically visible, if 
economically disenfranchised, members of the Nicaraguan polity points to how race 
works to preserve their position in the Nicaraguan political imaginary while maintaining 
black and indigenous exclusion. Further, this process also reveals the way in which 
mestizo political and economic elites reproduce racialized state power through the 
politics of land tenure. In aligning itself with a model of monopoly capitalism, the 
mestizo political elite disrupted the livelihoods of mestizo campesinos by colluding with 
an increasingly transnational economic elite that concentrate land-ownership among 
themselves. In the broader sketch of race and space in Nicaragua, the experiences of 
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mestizo campesinos during this period allow us to see that mestizos were not a 
homogeneous group, but rather held various levels of economic capital that determined 
their ability to negotiate their position in the national landscape. More importantly, we 
learn more about how race can be operationalized differently by paying attention to the 
ways in which mestizos in Nicaragua were not a homogeneous group, in this case by 
noting the differences that emerged along class lines during this period.  
If we understand capitalism and race as webs of inter-related practices that are 
frequently remade across time and space, then our understanding of this period would be 
incomplete if we didn’t also take into consideration how race was also being 
reformulated and re-operationalized. A comprehensive analysis of race in mid-twentieth 
century Nicaragua is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, one observation from 
this discussion is that mestizo Nicaraguan elites used race to continue excluding black 
and indigenous costeños while also obfuscating the class-based violence by appealing to 
campesinos’ sense of national belonging. As shown with the earlier discussion and in 
more detailed accounts by Hooker, this sense of national belonging was profoundly 
structured by race while also holding the stratifications produced along class and, though 
not discussed here, gender. (Hooker 2005a; Hooker 2010) 
It is telling that Robinson’s account of politics and economics in Nicaragua does 
not delve into the way in which the Nicaraguan state consolidated land ownership and 
economic wealth in the Pacific among mestizo elites while encouraging cash-poor 
campesinos to migrate eastward into the Caribbean coast territories. In fact, one of the 
most striking aspects of Robinson’s discussion is that he doesn’t explain how the process 
of regional autonomy highlights the significant economic variation between the 
Caribbean coast and the Pacific and central regions of Nicaragua. Without examining 
how wealth, violence and the titular “transnational conflict” are organized along racial 
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and regional lines in Nicaragua, it’s impossible to account for the different realities that 
take place on the coast and instead allows mestizo elites to continue reproducing 
narratives about a harmonious mestizo nation that silence and/or erase the lived 
experiences of black and indigenous costeños. Additionally, without discussing how 
nation-building projects have depended on the racial-spatial subordination of black and 
indigenous communities, it is easy to ignore how this system of monopoly capitalism was 
structured for the benefit of the mestizo nation-state and elites, just like the annexation of 
the Caribbean coast was also part of this genealogy of anti-black and anti-indigenous 
nation-state development. To complete this brief historical geography of race, I turn 
towards this process of regional autonomy that came about from the multicultural model 
of group rights in Nicaragua. 
Much has been made of the multicultural reforms in Latin American governments 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In concluding this section of the chapter, I turn towards the 
multicultural model of regional autonomy that was produced in 1987. After years of 
conflict following the Sandinista War and the Contra-war produced by Reagan’s 
administration, Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast was in the middle of important debates 
regarding its future political structure. For years, communities debated group-based rights 
for black and indigenous communities of the coast. However, the final model that 
emerged was one that granted autonomy not to the specific communities, but to the 
region as a whole. Law 28 called for regional autonomy of the Atlantic Coast (later 
renamed as the Caribbean coast) of Nicaragua, producing a northern and southern 
territory within the autonomous region. This law granted political autonomy to the region 
and the six groups that resided in the region: the Mayangna, Miskitu and Rama 
indigenous communities, the Creole and Garífuna Afro-descendant communities and 
mestizos. This model allowed each group to have representation in regional government 
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councils. Since this happened in 1987 and mestizos gained majority group status on the 
coast in 1981, mestizos remained the racial group with most political representation and 
power on the coast. (Hooker 2009: 140) Thus, while the autonomy regime allowed for 
cultural recognition, it did not address the need and desire of black and indigenous 
communities for self-governance. This form of regional autonomy neglects to address the 
racial injustice against black and indigenous costeños upon which Nicaraguan nation-
building projects have been built. Instead, as Hooker shows, this form of autonomy 
reinscribes racial diversity on Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast within older forms of mestizo 
nationalism, a form of multicultural rights that Hooker terms “mestizo multiculturalism.” 
(Hooker 2005) By limiting the extent to which regional autonomy can begin to formulate 
a more just society for black and indigenous costeños, mestizo multiculturalism is part of 
this historical geography of race insofar as it continues to preserve mestizo political 
power despite the reality that many mestizos on the Caribbean coast are indeed cash-poor 
migrants from the Pacific and central regions of the country. 
However, regional autonomy was not entirely ineffective in providing legal 
protections for black and indigenous costeños. By extending collective rights to all the 
racial groups of the coast, the autonomy regime has allowed the legal and rhetorical 
foundations on which to make arguments regarding black and indigenous collective land 
rights. Cases like Awas Tingni and more recent legal developments like Law 445 have 
proved to be important victories for these communities. In a context in which they have 
not otherwise achieved legal protections to establish self-governance and racial 
autonomy, these victories have been a way to achieve some measure of protection for the 
claims to land on which these communities have lived long before Nicaraguan 
independence and the migration of today’s Caribbean coast mestizo majority. 
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This being said, Gordon, Hooker, Morris, and Goett have all written about how 
black costeños’ rights and safety continue to be consistently violated. (Gordon 1998; 
Hooker 2005b; Morris 2012; Goett 2017) Indeed, it is the longstanding and increasingly 
violent violation of their rights and of the autonomy law itself that has produced the 
practices of resistance that Goett centers and documents in Black Autonomy and that 
Morris’ research also explores. Currently, the violence surrounding land claims 
throughout the Caribbean coast continues to escalate, resulting in the homicides of black 
and indigenous costeños as mestizo farmers take extralegal control of more and more 
land that has been historically worked and collectively owned by black and indigenous 
costeños. In this way, mestizos in the Caribbean coast continue to reproduce the deadly 
displacement of black and indigenous costeños. This process of displacement constitutes 
reflects the way in which mestizo multiculturalism fails to provide protections or redress 
for historical injustices to black and indigenous communities of Nicaragua’s Caribbean 
coast. It also shows the way in which an autonomy regime touted as “multicultural” still 
allows one group to continue violating the collective rights of other groups. I conclude 
this historical geography of race by discussing mestizo multiculturalism not only because 
of the chronology but also to show how even the achievement of supposed legal 
protections of collective rights are not enough to end the pattern of racialized 
displacement and violence in Nicaragua. 
Organization of the Thesis 
In this chapter, I’ve sketched out a brief historical geography of race to trace how 
race and space have been co-constitutive processes that structure the lives of mestizo 
Nicaraguans. In doing so, I’ve traced some of the conditions that produced mestizo 
migration from the Pacific and central regions of Nicaragua towards the Caribbean coast 
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territories that ultimately led to mestizos becoming the majority group since 1981. The 
articulation of a mestizo costeño identity is puzzling because it appears to emerge after 
decades of choosing not to identify along racial lanes. Most theories of social 
mobilization and the development of collective identity explain that movements emerge 
after structural opportunities align in such a configuration as to encourage or make 
possible the development of grassroots organization and mobilization. However, this type 
of extensive structural change seems to be missing in the last few years as an explanation 
for this emergent racial articulation. Thus, given the claims that mestizos made about 
discrimination, both in Morris’ observations and my own, several questions came up time 
and time again: Who are mestizos costeños? How do they think of themselves, other 
costeños and the coast? How do they fit into broader aspects of politics in Bluefields and 
Nicaragua, more broadly? In this remainder of the thesis, I use interview data and my 
observations and conversations in Bluefields to begin to answer these questions. 
In chapter two, I discuss the theoretical framework in which I base my analysis. I 
begin by discussing the relevant scholarship on race and ethnicity in Latin America and 
establish why I focus on race instead of ethnicity, a distinction that is particularly 
significant in the context of Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast given their use of vocabulary of 
“ethnicity” and apparent silence around “race.” I then examine the scholarship that has 
focused on mestizos and mestizo racial identity in Latin America while paying attention 
to the relationship between the questions scholars have asked and the methodology they 
employ. Here, I also discuss how ethnography has been crucial in answering the kinds of 
questions I pose in this thesis. I conclude by discussing how the methodological tools of 
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ethnography and my own positionality in the field allowed me generate the data to 
answer the questions this thesis explores.  
In chapter three I present the main discursive elements of mestizo costeños’ 
articulation of their racial identity. I trace out two sets of elements and contextualize them 
within broader traditions of social and political thought they draw from and engage with 
in their narratives. In doing so, I show how these narratives are not simply about 
capturing a set of cultural practices, a strategy of assimilation or a social psychological 
phenomenon of identity. Instead, I show how these narratives reflect mestizos costeños’ 
engagement with politics across scale, notably to make claims to land rights’ in the 
context of regional autonomy. 
In chapter four, I conclude with a discussion of the utility of identity politics in 
crafting future political projects. Mestizos costeños articulate an account of history and 
identity that is mutually imbricated to their ideas about politics on the coast. In this 
chapter, I briefly discuss how identity politics are being challenged not only on the coast 
but in the United States as well, including in bizarre ways by those who supposedly reject 
this framework. In this chapter, I turn to Charles Mills’ critique of racial liberalism to 
show how black Creole women leaders have used identity politics to craft an approach 
that takes into account the complex history of violence and recognizing the limits of 
working with the systems currently in place. Thus, in this chapter I examine what we 
stand to learn about identity politics by taking into consideration how black Creoles and 
mestizos costeños in Bluefields are articulating their identities as they engage broader 
political projects on the coast and throughout Nicaragua.  
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Chapter 2:  Articulating Race on Nicaragua’s Caribbean Coast 
In this chapter I review the current literature on race, racial identity, and racism. I 
begin by examining how scholarship on race in Latin America has shifted to unsettle 
previous assumptions that sociologists from the United States made about Latin 
American ideas about race. While much of the research continues to grapple with 
identity, I suggest that a useful approach would be Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation. 
Given the difficulty of finding official texts normally analyzed in discourse analysis, I 
turn to ethnography to directly observe how mestizos in Bluefields, Nicaragua construct 
the discourse of mestizos costeños. To continue the review of the literature, I show how 
three scholars use ethnography to generate insights that are not only analytically useful, 
but also representative of the kind of project that allows us to answer the questions 
through the framework of articulation. I conclude the chapter by briefly detailing how I 
conducted the interviews in Bluefields that I analyze in the remaining chapters. 
Towards an Articulation of Racial Projects 
One of the central goals of this chapter is to highlight how recent scholarship has 
turned away from taking race and racial identity for granted and instead interrogating 
how they are constructed and used. Mara Loveman’s comment in the December 1999 
issue of the American Sociological Review, “Is Race Essential?”, highlights this turn as 
she responds to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s 1997 article, “Rethinking Racism,” in which he 
calls for a structural theorization of race and racism. Loveman’s critique of Bonilla-
Silva’s structural approach is predicated upon her preference for a “comparative 
sociology of group-making.” (Loveman 1999) Loveman’s essay is a useful starting point 
for discussing the sociological literature on race and racism because it raises several 
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questions about the way that sociologists have conceptualized and operationalized race. 
Loveman structures her critique in three parts.  
She begins by noting that Bonilla-Silva treats race as both a category and a group. 
Loveman concedes that such a conflation may be adequate in some contexts but 
decidedly erroneous in others, particularly when racial identity –individual as well as 
collective- does not align with the experiences of a broader group. (891) Since the 
publication of Bonilla-Silva and Loveman’s exchange, a rich and vast literature has 
emerged to support this point. Much of this literature has also grappled with Loveman’s 
second concern, which examines how race becomes “reified” in scholarly analyses 
despite observations that some social actors choose to reject race altogether as a social-
analytical lens for their experience. Loveman provides the example of black activists in 
Brazil that had to do the work of raising racial consciousness before being able to 
mobilize around racial injustice, thus showing how race was not a central aspect of 
identity but rather one that was made as such. The utility of this intervention is in pausing 
to ask if scholars are asking the right questions.  
By being more attentive to the ways in which context matters for understanding 
how groups have used race as a social construction, scholars have produced a research 
agenda that reformulates the way race figures in their projects. For example, in “Beloved 
Enemies,” political theorist Juliet Hooker traces the way the Nicaraguan nation-state used 
race to identify who was included and excluded in the national political community 
throughout three distinct national discourses in the 20th century. In “Beloved Enemies,” 
Hooker sets out to understand the ends to which race was being used and how it was 
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operationalized to meet those ends. Likewise, in Tianna Paschel’s recent ethnography, 
Becoming Black Political Subjects, Paschel examines how activists in Colombia and 
Brazil make their claims to their respective nation-states without presuming that race 
and/or ethnicity are given, static or central sociological objects of analysis. I discuss both 
of these works in subsequent sections but present them now as examples of scholarship 
that do not “reify race,” but instead focus on highlighting to what extent and in what 
ways race matters. This scholarship goes beyond Loveman’s call for a Weberian analysis 
of group closure by further illuminating other ways in which social and political actors 
have mobilized race beyond the social psychological arena of individual racial identities. 
Instead, Hooker and Paschel ask how race matters in organizing power and examine how 
different groups have used ideas about race to do specific forms of political work across 
time and space. 
Loveman’s final critique of Bonilla-Silva’s proposal for a structural theory of 
racism challenges the need to make an analytical distinction between race and ethnicity. 
Although Loveman focuses on Bonilla-Silva’s theory, her observation of Bonilla-Silva 
reproducing notions of race and ethnicity that are specific to the US in non-US contexts is 
a trend seen throughout much of the sociological literature on race and ethnicity in Latin 
America, regardless of whether the literature centrally engages in theorizing race and 
ethnicity in the region. (Telles and Paschel 2014) I read Loveman’s critique as suggesting 
that the scholarship was not only reifying race by taking for granted its significance but 
also assuming that race was static across time and space.  
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I suggest that one of the ways in which sociologists reproduce the trends that 
Loveman notes is by relying on a small set of theoretical and analytical frameworks. 
Indeed, as recently as 2015 Mustafa Emirbayer and Matt Desmond claimed that there has 
never been a comprehensive theory of race. (Emirbayer and Desmond 2015: 1) Although 
Emirbayer and Desmond’s claims are questionable, their argument reflects how 
sociology as a discipline continues to struggle with defining race and racism. At the same 
time, even Emirbayer and Desmond note the extensive presence and influence of a small 
group of texts in the literature, particularly Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s popular 
text, Racial Formation in the United States. In the 2015 third edition, Omi and Winant 
revise some aspects of their theoretical framework and incorporate more contemporary 
empirical examples to clarify their arguments. Despite Loveman’s earlier critiques and 
continued efforts to move beyond racial formation framework, as exemplified by 
Emirbayer and Desmond’s Racial Order, Omi and Winant’s text continues to shape how 
sociologists think and write about race and racism. Given its prevalence in the field, its 
worth noting some of the more relevant contributions it makes to framing the discussion 
that sociologists have about race and racism. 
Insofar as Racial Formations in the United States continues to frame how 
sociologists conceptualize and think about race and racism, Omi and Winant’s text makes 
the following useful contributions: a concise analysis of how sociology has discussed 
race and a “theory of racial formation.” First, they present a discussion of three 
theoretical paradigms that emerged in US sociology during the 20th century to challenge 
the ideas of scientific racism and eugenics. This review identifies ethnicity, nation, and 
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class as the three analytical categories that scholars offered as a way to challenge 
prevailing narratives of white supremacy. Omi and Winant conclude, however, that these 
theoretical trends failed to grapple with the way racialized violence has been a 
fundamental political process for centuries. This edition does a better job of referencing 
the contributions of scholars of color, especially black authors and notably Jamaican 
philosopher Charles Mills’ The Racial Contract. Throughout the text, Omi and Winant 
also frequently remind readers that race should be understood as being co-constituted by 
gender, class and sexuality, citing Patricia Hill Collins, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Angela 
Davis, and more women of color that have more incisively theorized how race has been 
constructed and operationalized in the United States. Given these and many other 
references to other works in the field of critical race theory, it is odd that they don’t 
engage with the ideas and theories of these scholars more substantively in their theory of 
racial formation. 
This theory of racial formation is the second major contribution that I glean from 
this text in framing the discussion that sociologists have about race and racism. Omi and 
Winant identify their theory of racial formation as the linkages between the production of 
racial meaning and the way those meanings are “translated into social structures and 
become racially signified.” (Omi and Winant 2015: 109) They state that one major goal 
of this theory is to be able to identify how racial projects are operationalized and, 
therefore, if a given project is racist or not. Although their discussion focuses on 
empirical examples from the United States, some scholars that study race in Latin 
America have used these theoretical contributions as analytical jump offs from which to 
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begin making sense of how race is constructed and to what ends in various contexts 
beyond the United States. As Loveman argued, however, this is neither enough nor 
entirely appropriate. Sociologist Edward Telles and his collaborators on the Project on 
Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA) provide a useful intervention in their 2014 
work Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race, and Color in Latin America.  
In Pigmentocracies, Telles and the PERLA team analyze the results of an original 
survey that examines public opinion, educational attainment, occupational status and 
various forms of identity in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. One of the most 
controversial and innovative aspects of this study was its use of an eleven-tone skin color 
palette that interviewers used to “measure” the skin color of survey respondents. As part 
of the analysis and discussion, Telles and the corresponding PERLA team for each 
country direct their analysis towards understanding the relationship between skin color 
and respondents’ notions of race, ethnicity, and identity. Pigmentocracies demonstrates 
how race and ethnicity are sociological objects that are produced and infused with 
context-specific meaning by respondents and their political projects. 
One example from the text comes in the chapter on Colombia. In this chapter, 
Telles and PERLA analyze ethnoracial and social inequality in Colombia by presenting 
and discussing the data they collected on years of schooling, high status non-manual 
occupations and mean monthly income. For all three of these categories (and a fourth one 
on respondent’s parents’ mean years of schooling) a pattern emerged in which 
respondents that self-identified as mestizo and mulatto (the two mixed-race categories of 
the five options) had higher mean years of schooling, a higher proportion in high status 
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non-manual occupations and higher mean monthly salaries than their white, indigenous 
or black counterparts (the three monoracial categories). However, each of these charts 
also included the data when sorted by skin color. Lighter-skinned respondents had more 
years of schooling, a higher proportion in high status non-manual occupations and higher 
mean monthly salaries than their medium- and darker-skinned counterparts. (Telles 2014: 
109-112) Most respondents identified as mestizo or mulatto while still expressing sharp 
patterns of inequality within those categories, revealing that skin color was a more 
accurate predictor of inequality than racial categories.  
Placing this evidence in conversation with the data on public opinion regarding 
attitudes towards affirmative action and ethnoracial movements in Colombia, the 
researchers conclude that one of the reasons why there is such high self-identification in 
the mixed-race categories is the specific national discourse of mixed-race heritage in 
Colombia. While Pigmentocracies does not trace the specific trajectories of race in the 
many nation-building projects across Latin America, it serves as a useful text insofar as it 
provides a thorough profile of how race, ethnicity, skin color and identity are used in the 
four countries that the book analyzes. This distinction in the way race works across 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru reflects a shift from the assumption that race is 
constant across context and begins to more robustly address Loveman’s call towards 
decentering US-notions of race beyond their utility.1 Further, Telles and the PERLA team 
                                                
1 While I agree with their analysis that narrow conceptualizations of race from US sociologists is not 
entirely useful in fully understanding how race works in Latin America, I don’t think that ideas about race 
in Latin America are entirely separate from ideas of race in the US. In Theorizing Race in the Americas 
Hooker explores how these two sets of ideas about race are related by charting a hemispheric intellectual 
genealogy of racial thinking.  
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conclude that there is nothing about racial or ethnic identity that inherently caused the 
inequality they discuss. Instead, they examine how these identities capture and reflect 
how survey respondents use the ideas of race and ethnicity in their constructing their 
identities as part of contemporary sociopolitical projects. As such, one important question 
that emerges from this text is: to what ends is a particular racial project being produced? 
Further, if identities don’t easily align to tell us about the political project of a particular 
person or group, to what extent is identity still a useful way of understanding racial 
projects? 
Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation provides a useful heuristic for answering these 
questions. Hall explains that an articulation is a “connection that can make a unity of two 
different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, 
determined, absolute and essential for all time.” (Hall 1997: 141, emphasis in the 
original) Using a visual example, he invokes “an ‘articulated’ lorry (truck): a lorry where 
the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but need not necessarily, be connected to one 
another. The two parts are connected, but through a specific linkage, that can be broken.” 
(141) In the examples from Pigmentocracies, it’s clear that there is nothing necessary or 
determined about the way racial identity works within and across national contexts. 
Historically, mestizos in Nicaragua have not used race or ethnicity to identify themselves, 
identifying themselves primarily as national subjects (nicaragüenses) rather than the 
racialized term ‘mestizo.’ There seems to be nothing necessary or determined about 
identifying as mestizos, costeños, or mestizos costeños for mestizos in Bluefields, 
marking the emergence if mestizo costeño “identity” all the more intriguing after more 
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than 150 years of being mestizos that are, technically, costeños insofar as they’ve been on 
the coast.  
Hall’s idea of articulation pushes us to examine these points of articulation, the 
unnecessary linkages of various elements, to understand what is meaningful about the 
discourse in the context in which it is produced. This approach centers the agency of 
social actors while also requiring our analysis to provide sufficient and appropriate 
context with which to understand a specific articulated discourse. Indeed, Hall goes on to 
say that “the ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between that articulated discourse and the 
social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not 
necessarily, be connected.” (141) Thus, I identify two kinds of linkages in Hall’s theory 
of articulation: discursive and social linkages. The discursive linkages are those linkages 
that an individual or group creates to connect, or articulate, two or more elements in a 
discourse but are not “necessary, determined, absolute and essential.” The social linkages 
are made analytically to understand the context in which the articulated discourse gains 
social and political significance.  
Hall’s theory of articulation pushes us to make sense of the way in which the 
discourse of mestizos costeños is socially produced in a specific spatial, temporal, and 
political context. This theory suggests that a specific set of “social forces” converged to 
create a set of conditions under which this particular racial articulation (“mestizo 
costeños”) could be possible, though not necessary. By examining the discursive linkages 
that produce mestizo costeño discourse (MCD), we can see how the practice of linking 
various elements serves a social and political purpose. As such, this approach allows us to 
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go beyond simply cataloguing the elements of a racial or ethnic identity, and instead 
focus on how the specific assemblage of these elements are used to connect individuals to 
broader groups and projects. 
To make visible the discursive linkages, I use semi-structured in-depth interviews 
to analyze how self-identified mestizos costeños articulate MCD themselves. In 
discussing the major elements that are articulated by mestizos costeños as part of MCD, I 
also discuss how they engage with major ideas in Latin American political thought. My 
goal here is to show how MCD connects to broader political and social forces that shape 
the experiences of mestizos in Bluefields and becomes meaningful only through the 
specific temporal, spatial and political contexts in which it is produced. To this end, the 
remainder of this chapter explores how scholars have used ethnographic methods to 
produce data that allows us to see how race is articulated in Latin America. I begin with 
Tianna Paschel’s Becoming Black Political Subjects and then discuss two ethnographies 
that examine mestizo racial projects. These last two ethnographies are among the most 
substantive engagements with the politics of mestizo racial identity, although there is 
admittedly very little scholarship that examines how mestizos articulate mestizo racial 
projects. 
Ethnography and Racial Articulation in Latin America 
I now turn my attention to three ethnographies: Becoming Black Political Subjects 
by Tianna Paschel, Indigenous Mestizos by Marisol de la Cadena, and Más Que Un Indio 
by Charles Hale. For each text, I examine how the evidence each author provides works 
to directly substantiate their observations or theoretical insights. I undertake this exercise 
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with two goals. The first goal is to show how these authors use ethnography to study race 
in various parts of Latin America. Second, I am also interested in showing how these 
authors make visible the non-necessary linkages in the racial articulations they examine. 
My hope here is to provide examples of how ethnography has been useful in producing 
data that can make visible how race is articulated in context-specific and non-necessary 
ways. 
In Becoming Black Political Subjects: Movements and Ethno-Racial Rights in 
Colombia and Brazil, sociologist Tianna Paschel sets out to trace how black Colombians 
and Brazilians developed a black consciousness despite being in contexts where 
widespread, collective black identity was hardly the case. Paschel turns to Hall’s theory 
of articulation to explain how black activists challenge black co-nationals to 
reconceptualize their politics by explicitly engaging race, reminding us that the way 
discourses of racial identity are assembled must be examined instead of taken for granted 
as always already present. 
Traditionally, ethnography as a method is discussed only in terms of the data-
producing processes of participant observation and interviews. (Emerson, Fretz, and 
Shaw 2014; Katz 2001, 2002) However, if Hall’s theory is to be useful, then 
ethnographic texts must also contextualize the observations, interviews, oral histories, 
etc. that they present and analyze. Hall explains that the social linkages are the linkages 
made between the discursive articulations and the specific social contexts in which they 
are forged. Becoming Black Political Subjects highlights why this is not only an 
important aspect of understanding the political context of racial articulations, but 
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essential if the goal is to understand what kind of political work a racial articulation can 
do. Paschel fulfills this mandate by providing an extensive analysis of the historical 
contexts in which blackness has been situated throughout Latin American nation-building 
projects.  
She begins this in Chapter Two, “Making Mestizajes,” by showing how 
Colombian and Brazilian nation-building projects in the 19th century conceptualized 
blackness in distinct but related ways. Further, the distinct ability of each state to enforce 
its nationalistic myths about race also explain the different racial configurations 
Colombia and Brazil. Paschel then brings in ethnographic vignettes to illustrate how 
these historical trajectories of mestizaje have produced the context in which distinct ideas 
about blackness manifest today in Colombia and Brazil. Paschel uses quotes from these 
interviews to highlight her earlier point that the success of these social movements was 
never guaranteed and that an “oppositional racial consciousness” was anything but 
widespread in either context, preventing the mobilization that social movements require. 
For example, on page 73 Paschel presents a quote by Brazilian activist Amauri Mendes in 
which he recounts an early experience of standing on a street corner with a megaphone to 
“verbally attack people,” a strategy to directly puncture the silence around race and bring 
a discussion of racism into the public sphere.  
Here and throughout the text, Paschel explains that a black consciousness was 
intentionally created to allow black Brazilians not only to organize as such, but also to 
express their critique of Brazilian racism specifically as black Brazilian political subjects. 
In this way, Paschel uses her observations and interviews to show how the discourse of 
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black Brazilian identity was located in the context of critiquing racism through demands 
that black activists made to the state. Consequently, Paschel’s theorization of social 
movements and the “global ethno-racial field” through Bourdieu’s concept of political 
fields directly responds to Stuart Hall’s call to contextualize discursive linkages to social 
linkages in his theory of articulation. By tracing the context in which black activists in 
Colombia and Brazil constructed their politics through archival research, Paschel’s 
ethnographic findings provide the discursive elements that activists chose to connect as 
they made themselves black political subjects.  
The text continues to map out the social and political context in which discourses 
of black political subjectivity were produced through Paschel’s analysis of records from 
the International Third World Conference against Racism in Durban, the Santiago 
Regional Conference of the Americas and the national assemblies of both Colombia and 
Brazil. These archives show how discourses of multiculturalism were developed through 
global and international processes in what Paschel terms the “global ethno-racial field,” 
which constructed blackness in ways that the Colombian and Brazilian states would later 
use in their own domestic politics. In arguing for understanding the shift from the 
multicultural alignment to the racial equality alignment, Paschel brings in interviews with 
activists and legislators from those time periods to substantiate the relationship that she 
identifies existing between global organizations and domestic political actors, giving 
analytical strength to her argument by centering the voices of the actors whose political 
labor she analyzes for the bulk of this section. Moreover, by explaining which discourses 
and material needs activists were responding to, Paschel’s observations and interviews 
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demonstrate how the assemblage of elements to produce an understanding of blackness in 
Brazil and Colombia was neither random nor immaterial, but rather highly strategic 
responses aimed directly at achieving specific goals. 
In one of the final chapters, “Unmaking Black Political Subjects,” Paschel shows 
how the policies of the early 2000s required black communities to contort themselves 
into narrow definitions of blackness if they wanted to benefit from the new policies 
developed in Colombia and Brazil. Throughout this chapter Paschel expands the warrant 
for her ethnography by showing the extent to which these new laws shaped everyday life 
for black Colombians and Brazilians. Her observations reveal the continuing pervasive 
state presence in black communities in Colombia in the form of state-sanctioned mining 
projects as well as the impulse of various black Colombians to create their own false 
organizations with the goals of both bolstering support for black communities on a 
statistical level while also gaining material benefits from the state to support themselves. 
Paschel strengthens her analysis of her observational data by interviewing the activists 
she writes about and allowing them to walk the reader through their logic, explaining for 
example why they began creating so many “paper organizations.” Along with the 
preceding chapter, this section marks the cornerstone of her ethnographic methodology in 
this project as she successfully captures the voice, logic and experiences of the political 
actors whose world she engages in her theorization of black social movements in 
Colombia and Brazil. Paschel uses ethnographic methodology to take seriously the 
political thought and strategies of black Colombian and Brazilian activists, 
simultaneously tracing how this contemporary articulation of blackness is historically and 
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materially situated. In reading Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation into her analysis, I 
understand her text as showing how black activists forged discursive linkages in order to 
articulate black identity in a context in which blackness was defined narrowly and 
specifically by the nation-state.  
In Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-
1991, Marisol de la Cadena explores a process that she calls de-Indianization. De la 
Cadena argues that “Indian” is a term used by Cuzqueños to specifically refer to the 
embodied “historical stigma of colonized inferiority.” (de la Cadena 2003, 6) Thus, 
“Indianness is perceived as a social condition that reflects an individual’s failure to 
achieve educational improvement.” (6) In short, de-Indianization is a process by which a 
group of working-class indigenous Cuzqueños signify retention of indigenous culture 
while simultaneously distancing themselves from the stigma of “colonized inferiority” 
generally attributed to Indianness. This process of de-Indianization provides another 
example of a racial articulation. De la Cadena begins her text by tracing the intellectual 
genealogy of racial thought in Peru, providing the context in which ideas of Indianness 
and mestizaje emerged. One important dynamic that she explores is what she terms as a 
set of “interregional dialogical racial struggles.” Throughout the text, de la Cadena shows 
how this interregional dialogue about race between Lima and Cuzco is one that generates 
the social forces in which working-class indigenous Cuzqueños would articulate a 
mestizo identity when entering urban centers like Lima. In Indigenous Mestizos, the 
notion that there is a regionally-organized racial conflict helps make visible why and how 
indigenous Cuzqueños would choose articulate mestizaje. 
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Throughout the text, de la Cadena explores various aspects of de-Indianization 
through the mining of various archives and a careful ethnographic approach. Her in-depth 
descriptions and carefully chosen interviews reveal how indigenous mestizos articulate 
their mestizo identity. One example comes in Chapter 4, “Insolent Mestizas and Respeto: 
The Redefinition of Mestizaje.” When interviewing Lucrecia, de la Cadena shares the 
following excerpt from her interview:  
I am a mestiza fighter, I have always worked along with my husband so that my 
children would never want for anything. I have stood up to anyone who 
disrespected me… They call us ‘those cholas,’ they insult us; they think we are 
thieves and whores…I am only a worker and I have helped my husband all my 
life…Because of that all my sons have been educated and now all of them, every 
one is a professional. 
 
In this excerpt, de la Cadena shows us how Lucrecia links the disrespect attributed to 
cholas with her desire and need to provide for her children. Instead, she subverts the 
category of chola and the disrespect it is given and articulates herself as a “mestiza 
fighter,” a “worker” who has worked alongside her husband to turn each of her ten sons 
into a professional. De la Cadena shows us how mestizas like Lucrecia use the politics of 
morality to challenge anti-indigenous racism by re-articulating themselves as mestizas. 
De la Cadena’s observations and interviews provide an important set of voices that are 
frequently omitted or obscured in the archives assembled for scholarship: indigenous 
thinkers, especially youth. By placing their ideas in a sustained conversation with those 
of the political and economic elite, Marisol de la Cadena shows the multiple ways in 
which mestizaje is articulated in Cuzco, Peru. Further, by tracing the intellectual 
genealogy of racial thought in which these articulations are embedded, she allows us to 
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see how working-class indigenous Cuzqueños articulate a mestizo identity as a strategy to 
retain indigenous practices while also living dignified lives. (327) Thus, ethnographic 
methods allow contemporary researchers to “take seriously the critical intellectual 
production of those historically denied the category of ‘thinkers.’” (Walsh 2007) 
Moreover, by not romanticizing resistance or glossing over important contradictions, de 
la Cadena is able to use ethnography to more fully account for the social forces that shape 
the choices that working-class indigenous Cuzqueños make. 
To this end, de la Cadena is clear throughout her analysis that such an articulation 
is not a neat contestation of racism. Indeed, one of the central contributions of de la 
Cadena’s analysis is that the category of mestizo and the process of mestizaje have 
always had ambivalent political potentials. As Hooker notes, Vasconcelos’ initial 
formulation of mestizaje was at once anti-imperialist while decidedly reinforcing multiple 
racist tropes. (Hooker 2017) Throughout the text, de la Cadena presents mestizaje as a 
“terrain of political contestation and dialogic reformulation in which elite and grassroots 
intellectuals dispute meanings of identity labels and rights to equal citizenship.” (de la 
Cadena 2000: 318) The depth of her archival work certainly reveals the contested and 
frequently reformulated nature of mestizaje in Peru between 1919 and 1991, betraying 
any idea of neat racial formations. Instead, de la Cadena’s theorization of de-
Indianization “also reveals complicity between dominant and subaltern groups in 
identifying “Indians” as the most contemptible members of society.” (328) By rejecting 
binary logics and instead focusing on the complexity and nuance with which Cuzqueños 
navigate the racial landscape of everyday life, de la Cadena offers an analysis that more 
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fully captures the lived experience the people that inform her study. Her insights into the 
politically multivalent nature of mestizaje are extended in Charles Hale’s Más Que Un 
Indio: Racial Ambivalence and Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala. 
 In Más Que Un Indio, Charles Hale explores what he calls Guatemalan ladinos’ 
“racial ambivalence.” Hale sets outs to understand the development of Maya politics over 
the last few decades by “reversing the ethnographic gaze” from the Maya onto ladinos. 
By examining ladino political thought and taking seriously their interpretation of local 
and national-level politics, Hale makes various contributions to the literature on 
Guatemala. First and foremost, this is one of the few, if not the only, ethnographic 
account of ladinos that interrogates their interpretation of the Maya movement. Second, 
Hale points out that most of the literature references or discusses ladinos in Guatemala as 
caricatured oppressors or erases them altogether. Instead, Hale’s ethnographic approach 
allows the reader to gain a closer look at the contradictions embedded within discourses 
of reverse racism and the lived experiences of ladinos in the town of Chimaltenango. 
Like de la Cadena’s approach, Hale’s ethnography is not concerned with facile 
categorizations or typographies of racial formations. Hale’s analysis makes visible how 
ladinos articulate the discourses of reverse racism precisely by focusing on the 
contradictions and tensions that he finds. 
 In trying to understand the historical and political trajectory of the Maya 
movement by examining the role and politics of ladinos, Hale creates a more complex 
racial geography of Guatemalan politics. This approach of focusing on the dominant 
racial group to obtain a fuller account of racial politics has served as a useful model for 
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this Master’s thesis. Just as Hale sought to better understand Maya politics by taking 
seriously and allowing ladinos’ politics to exist in multivalent complexity, I have tried to 
better understand the political context of Afro-descendant communities in Nicaragua’s 
Caribbean coast by examining the role of mestizos costeños. To this end, one of Hale’s 
most important contributions is carefully tracing out what “racial ambivalence” means. 
 Hale theorizes racial ambivalence as a set of phrases and ideas that “express 
dissatisfaction, criticism, and fear in response to the changing social conditions” that 
ladinos face. (Hale 2006: 118-119) Hale offers that “inherent in the perception of reverse 
racism is a critique of the classic racism that used to prevail” in Guatemala. (126) 
However, it is also accompanied by a subsequent logic of “self-exoneration.” Hale uses 
his interviews to allow ladinos to flesh out the contours of racial ambivalence in their 
own voice. In the passage where Hale explains this simultaneous denunciation of classic 
racism and the concurrent self-exoneration, he shares how a ladino explained it: At times 
this critique [against classical racism] encompasses a healthy dose of self-criticism, and 
other times an insistence that, as Don Rolando put it, “What happened, happened. Why 
should we take the blame for what took place five hundred years ago?” (126) By 
embedding the voices of ladinos throughout the prose and into his analysis, Hale takes 
seriously the political implications of the discourse that ladinos developed regarding 
racial politics in Guatemala. Moreover, like Paschel and de la Cadena, Hale’s approach is 
one that allows us to produce data that is useful to answering the questions I set out to 
answer within the framework of racial articulation.  
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 Hale’s account of ladinos’ interpretation of the Maya movement shows that ladino 
identity has at one point embraced classic racism while rejecting it in another point. At 
the same time, while ladinos reject classic racism, Hale shows how their discourse is 
linked to reconfiguring how racism operates in Guatemala. What these three texts reveal 
about ethnography is that it is particularly useful in making visible the two kinds of 
linkages that Stuart Hall identifies in his theory of articulation, especially when the group 
making these linkages has been understudied or has not produced easily accessible texts 
wherein we could find this discourse. In the case of mestizos costeños, they have been 
ignored thus far either geographically, when most scholars intentionally choose to ignore 
the Caribbean coast, or racially, when most scholars discussing the Caribbean coast focus 
only Afro-descendant or indigenous communities. As such, I draw from the analytical 
and methodological insights of these texts in designing my research methodology.  
Methodology and Positionality in Bluefields 
The data produced for this thesis is based on interviews conducted with self-
identified mestizos costeños in Bluefields, Nicaragua during the summer of 2016. I began 
my research with a conversation with Nora Newball and Dolene Miller, previous leaders 
of the Creole communal government. Both are Afro-descendant women who have long 
been a part of the Creole community’s struggles for justice in Bluefields as well as in the 
national arena. Following Walsh’s call to extend the category of thinker to those who 
have been denied it, I used their account of history and politics as an analytical entry 
point to begin understanding how Creole women in Bluefields would construct the 
“interregional dialogical racial struggles” in Nicaragua.  
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Newball and Miller’s account is an important way to begin thinking about how 
self-identified mestizos costeños talked about race, identity, history, autonomy, and land 
rights in Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast by providing an account of history and politics that 
has been silenced by scholars, political elites and popular media alike. Indeed, while 
some scholars have begun to write about Afro-descendant communities in Nicaragua’s 
Caribbean coast, it is not new to write about the African diaspora. However, the pattern in 
much of the scholarship takes for granted that theory is produced in the global North 
while the global South provides the empirical studies on which to build the careers and 
industry of academics. In trying to intentionally depart from this, I turn to Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot’s work on silence in historiography as a way of beginning to outline my 
methodology. 
In Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History, Trouillot offers a 
theory of history by examining how power shapes its production. More specifically, 
Trouillot suggests that there are four moments in which silence enters the process of 
historical production: “the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment 
of fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of 
narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the 
final instance).” (emphasis in the original) (Trouillot 1995, 26) By taking Newball and 
Miller’s historical narrative as a “moment of fact creation” that is assembled through 
their process of “fact retrieval,” my goal is to continue addressing the academic silence 
around mestizo racial projects in Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast and their attendant 
consequences for Afro-descendants in Bluefields.  
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Another reason why this initial conversation with Newball and Miller was 
important is because it helped me pay attention to the dynamics and questions that I 
might not otherwise know to ask. Aside from not being from the Caribbean coast, I am 
the light-skinned son of two mestizo Nicaraguans who raised me in the United States, 
where I also gained my education. Beyond the standard hand-wringing statement to 
acknowledge the privileges I am given due to how I am positioned in multiply-
constituted matrices of power, I am interested in pointing out that my positionality 
reflects the kind of questions that I would ask as well as the ones I would not know to 
ask. For example, although my family is Nicaraguan, they are mestizos from the Pacific 
coast and had virtually no interaction with anyone on the Caribbean coast. As Rhacel 
Parreñas reminds us, my positionality then is important to note not because it is a unique 
configuration of identities or privileges, but because those identities and privileges mean 
that I experience the world differently than others. Moreover, the significance to this 
project is that I should be mindful as I craft my methodology to be attentive to how I 
experience the world differently than the people I write about so that I may provide a 
more honest account and better analysis of the question at hand. To that end, it struck me 
that it was curious that mestizos in Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast did not use race as a way 
to identify themselves despite living on the Coast for over a century and being the 
majority group for over three decades. However, taking into consideration Parreñas’ call 
to put our reflexivity to work, I also ask what kind of political work the emergence of 
mestizo costeño identity discourse can do. To answer this question, I examine how 
mestizos costeños construct this discourse and then present Newball and Miller’s 
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interpretation as a counterhistory. In doing so, I interrogate how these two accounts 
diverge as a way to examine what is useful for mestizos about articulating themselves as 
mestizos costeños. 
The interviews with mestizos in Bluefields were semi-structured and varied in 
length. During the interviews, I asked participants to tell me about how they identified, 
what that meant to them, and how this might be related to the regional politics of 
autonomy. What I found was a fairly consistent discourse about mestizo racial identity 
that drew heavily on well-established narratives of mestizaje. In the following chapter, I 
present how mestizos in Bluefields produce the discourse of mestizo costeño identity by 











Chapter 3: “Sitting on a Time Bomb” 
The morning was particularly humid when I walked into the white and blue 
building on the corner. Up the dark wooden stairs and through one of the three doors on 
the landing, Orlando Obando was waiting at his desk. During our interview, Orlando 
shared that he has had multiple positions working for the Caribbean coast governments 
for all of his professional life. Most recently, he is a member of the Southern Caribbean 
coast regional electoral council.  
It was not very difficult to get the conversation going. After the usual 
introductions and setting up the audio recording device, I asked him about how he 
identified and what he could tell me about that. Orlando spoke for about an hour from 
this prompt alone. Like the others I interviewed, he spoke about identifying as a mestizo 
costeño and how important the regional dimension of that identity was to understanding 
what he was talking about. He talked about regional differences between mestizos, how 
mestizos migrated to the Caribbean coast over time from various places, and how the six 
different ethnic groups on the coast get along harmoniously. Until they didn’t. About an 
hour into the interview, Orlando said: 
Defining the notion of property has brought us to a point in which we are 
sitting on a time bomb because people are exacerbating animosities and creating 
ethnicism. They’ve even been using racism and it is an inverted racism. It isn’t 
mestizos against other ethnicities; it’s other ethnicities that believe themselves to 
be superior. 
 
(Definir el tema de la propiedad, nos ha llevado a un punto en cual 
estamos sentados en una bomba de tiempo porque ha habido gente que estan 
exacerbando ánimos y han estado creando el etnicismo. Han estado utilizando el 
racismo y es un racismo invertido. No es el mestizo contra otra etnia, es algunas 
etnias que se creen superiores.)2 
                                                
2 Interviews were conducted in Spanish. In the text, I’ve provided my own translations followed by the 
original Spanish in parenthesis. In the rare case when someone spoke in both English and Spanish, I’ve 
done my best to preserve their original choice. 
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The jarring and ominous tone of his assessment of racial politics on the coast 
confirmed how intricately woven racial politics were to ongoing struggles over land 
rights. However, if the six groups of the Caribbean coast territories were at one point 
coexisting harmoniously, as he said, where did this time bomb come from? To answer 
this question and those posed earlier in Chapter 1, I analyze how mestizos in Bluefields, 
Nicaragua articulate a discourse about mestizos costeños in the interviews I conducted.  
Borrowing from Hall, I use the verb “articulate” to signify both the expression of 
an idea and the construction of a discourse through intentional and unnecessary linkages. 
In the discussion that follows I identify two major sets of discursive elements that 
mestizos drew upon when discussing mestizos costeños: mestizaje and land rights. In 
discussing these two sets of discursive elements separately I don’t mean to say that they 
are discrete or neatly bounded. Instead, my intention is to show two general themes that 
allow us to make sense of the narratives that emerged in the interviews. These two sets of 
ideas and discursive elements are a useful way to begin interrogating the discourse that I 
heard on the Caribbean coast and were reiterated in the interviews that I recount here. 
Mestizos frequently discussed the process of mestizaje as it related to producing mixed-
race bodies in Nicaragua and, more specifically, on the Caribbean coast.  This set of 
discursive elements was frequently linked to claims to land rights on the Caribbean coast. 
In my discussion, I focus on identifying the discursive elements and the linkages that 
mestizos made among them to explore what kind of political work these linkages can do. 
In doing so, my goal is to make visible the social linkages that make these articulations 
meaningful, revealing the conditions that Hall’s theory says must be present to allow 
these articulations to be made. 
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Mestizaje and Identity on the Caribbean Coast 
When mestizos in Bluefields began to tell me about their identity as mestizos 
costeños, they consistently mentioned the same discursive building blocks. They began 
by identifying mestizos as mixed-race subjects that resided somewhere outside the 
Caribbean coast territories and within the boundaries of Nicaragua. They cited Managua 
and Chontales as their families’ original residence, and one young student at the 
Bluefields Indian and Caribbean University (BICU) said he came from Nueva Segovia. 
The narrative that emerged was of a hard-working, landless mestizo campesino who had 
to move his family eastward so that they could find land to cultivate and earn a living. 
This narrative of national expansion eastwards towards the Caribbean coast seemed to 
echo the same inevitable tone that is often found in texts that describes US expansion 
westward to the Pacific, also thought of in official discourses as inevitable and necessary. 
Orlando presents a concise summary of this part of the mestizo migration narrative: 
 
They came searching for better options. They weren’t big landowners. They 
began to invade the communal lands. The invaders were us, the mestizos. And 
yet, we learned to coexist and adopted the forms, customs and traditions of the 
people here. We mixed. You’ll find mestizos married with Creoles, mestizos 
married with Garifuna, mestizos married with Rama. I have a friend that says he 
doesn’t know what he is because he says “I’m mestizo because of my mother, 
black because of my father, so I’m mestigro!” 
 
(Venian buscando como mejorar sus opciones, que no eran grandes terratenientes. 
Empezaron a invadir las tierras comunales. Los invasores fuimos nosotros los 
mestizos. Sin embargo, aprendimos a coenvivir, coexistir y adoptamos las formas, 
costumbres y tradiciones de la gente de eca, nos mezclamos. Te encontras 
mestizos casados con Creoles, mestizos casados con Garífuna, mestizos casados 
con Rama. Tengo un amigo que dice que el no sabe que es, porque dice “Soy 
mestizo por mi madre, negro por mi padre, entonces soy mestigro!”) 
 
 Orlando’s explanation of mestizo migration to the Caribbean coast and the 
subsequent imagined social harmony establishes the foundation of mestizo costeño 
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discourse. In this excerpt, he begins to establish what anthropologist Charles Hale found 
among ladinos in Guatemala: a critical historical gaze that is coupled to a self-
exonerating present positionality. (Hale 2006) The critical historical gaze comes when he 
names mestizos as “invasores,” which I’ve translated as invaders. During my time in 
Bluefields and in brief excursions into neighboring communities of Pearl Lagoon, the 
Wawashang school and reserve, Afro-descendant and indigenous costeños often referred 
to mestizos interchangeably as “Spaniards” and “colonos,” literally colonists. By labeling 
mestizos as a group that invaded the Caribbean coast, Orlando reveals an awareness that 
Afro-descendants and indigenous communities had collective rights to the land, as 
established by Law 28 in the national constitution. And yet, he immediately pivots the 
narrative into the realm of social harmony.  
 In the quote above, Orlando establishes that after the initial injustice of invasion, 
mestizos learned to “coexist” and live in harmony with the other groups of the Caribbean 
coast. Here, Orlando turns to intergroup marriages as the ultimate symbol of progress. 
Beyond learning about each other’s culture, Orlando says that they “mixed” in a 
reference to intergroup marriages in which mestizos married Creoles, Garífuna, and 
Rama Indians. This trope of racial harmony echoes the work begun by Gilberto Freyre, 
widely credited with establishing the concept and discourse of racial democracy in Brazil. 
Indeed, the narratives about mestizaje that emerged in these interviews departed from the 
better-known trope of indigenous-white/Indo-Hispanic racial mixing and instead reflect a 
conceptualization of racial mixing that allows mestizos costeños to be connected to both 
indigenous and Afro-descendant groups on the coast. Sociologist Tianna Paschel notes 
that Freyre acknowledged and “valued” African insofar as it allowed him to essentialize 
Africans and recast them as “co-colonizers” of Brazil, distorting the way power was 
organized along racial lines. (Paschel 2016: 35) By establishing that mestizos costeños 
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are extensively mixed with other groups despite a history of past invasion, the discourse 
moves into the present realm in which cultural mixture has allowed racial harmony to 
take place, leaving past injustices beyond the realm of contemporary politics and 
flattening the uneven power relations between mestizos and Creoles in Bluefields. To 
make sense of how we go from this racial harmony to the “time bomb” that Orlando 
describes, it is useful to take into consideration another account of mestizo migration. 
 In Miguel Gonzalez’s account of mestizo migration to the Caribbean coast, 
Miguel connected how the different waves of migration are related to contemporary 
struggles over land rights. Miguel’s account emphasized how the politics of migration 
resulted in what costeños call la frontera agrícola, the agricultural frontier. During our 
conversation, he described mestizo migration to the Caribbean coast as consisting of two 
major waves. He locates the first wave of migration in the first two decades of the 20th 
century. He said this wave included mestizo “elites, lawyers, business-owners in 
Granada, Chontales, Managua, Matagalpa. Their children became costeños as they are 
born here but I don’t know that there was a sense of racial belonging for them, although 
there is definitely that sense among the indigenous and Afro-descendants on the coast.” 
He then goes on to identify the second major wave of mestizo migration as occurring in 
the 1950s and 1960s during the “proyectos de modernización,” or “modernization 
projects,” that the Nicaraguan state took on. Among these projects, he mentioned the 
concessions of land that the state made to allow the development of what sociologist 
William Robinson called “monopoly capitalism.” (Robinson 2003) Miguel explains that 
these projects were largely organized around plantation style agricultural economies that 
revolved around the production and exportation of coffee and beef. As mestizos 
campesinos lost the ability to maintain access to land, Miguel explains that the state 
began incentivizing mestizo migration east by a mixture of explicit policies that 
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facilitated this migration as well as turning a blind eye towards the occupation of 
indigenous and Afro-descendant collectively owned lands.  
 This second wave of migration is particularly important in understanding how 
Miguel linked mestizos migration to contemporary struggles of land. Miguel explains that 
during this wave of migration, mestizos begin to settle in the “old agricultural frontier,” 
“la antigua frontera agrícola.” During my time in Bluefields, the agricultural frontier was 
frequently brought up in conversations that referenced mestizo migration and/or 
mestizos’ occupation of land throughout the Caribbean coast territories. As I heard 
costeños describe the frontier and sometimes even saw how the frontier moved eastward 
over the years on maps, it also struck me that the frontier was as much a physical 
demarcation as it was a space of contestation.  
When Miguel talked about the frontier, I asked him to tell me more about it and 
what it meant for mestizos who were migrating. To that, he responded that it was  
 
un modelo de pensamiento, como guia un tipo de acción, un tipo de imaginario 
que tiene un gran componente material, que es muy tangible. Significa para 
Nicaragua, poder relieve the pressure that peasants experienced during the 
plantation economy (particularly coffee, banana) to push that population to the 
east. Clearly a policy decision by the Somozas in the 50s to alleviate that pressure 
felt in Central Nicaragua. The east became that imaginary for the infinite 
expansion of agricultural economy and the subsistence economy. But it doesn’t 
make any sense, there’s no frontera agrícola anymore. ... The expansion of 
agricultural activities moves further eastward but [this idea of the frontera 
agrícola] stays in the narrative because it conveys a way of thinking. 
Miguel’s historical narrative of the second wave of mestizo migration aligns more closely 
with the kind of mestizos that Orlando described as hard-working and landless 
campesinos that went in search of opportunities. However, the linkage in Miguel’s 
narrative is not between mestizo migration and racial harmony, but between mestizo 
migration and the nationally-endorsed occupation of the Caribbean coast territories. 
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Miguel thinks of the agricultural frontier as an “imaginary,” a “way of thinking,” that has 
a major material aspect to it. Here, Miguel’s articulation of mestizo migration reveals an 
analysis that also connects the role of the state in producing the conditions that 
encouraged mestizo migration and encouraged the development of the imaginary that 
Miguel identifies as the agricultural frontier.  
 Reading these two accounts of mestizo migration to Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast 
allows us to see some useful resonances and divergences. Both Miguel and Orlando 
narrate mestizo migration as a process shaped by economic need. As is the case for many 
migrants around the world, the decision to leave a home community often includes the 
desire and/or need for a better economic future when they do not think they have access 
to one in their current situation. In the case of campesinos moving into and across the 
agricultural frontier, Miguel and Orlando suggest that these mestizos were economically 
displaced as a result of the state’s economic strategy and desire to engage in the global 
market through the monopoly capitalism that concentrated land and wealth among an 
economic elite in the majority mestizo Pacific and Central regions of Nicaragua. The 
narratives of migration diverge when we begin to pay attention to how Miguel and 
Orlando narrate the outcomes of these migrations. Where Orlando articulated a future of 
racial harmony and cultural mixture, Miguel framed mestizo occupations of lands as 
extra-legal occupations. This divergence points to the different emphases that Orlando 
and Miguel placed on mestizo costeño identity and the kind of political work that these 
linkages do. Orlando’s narrative erases the racialized and gendered violence that Creoles 
face throughout the Caribbean coast and in Bluefields in general. (Goett 2017; Morris 
2016)  The linkage in Miguel’s narrative still refers to mixed-race mestizos that migrate 
to the Caribbean coast in search of economic opportunities, but it does not make use of 
the self-exoneration that Hale finds among many ladinos and that Orlando uses earlier in 
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the interview. Thus, Miguel’s narrative provides one way of thinking about mestizo 
costeños that does not rely on reconciling past violences that have not actually been 
addressed. 
Returning to my original prompt for both Orlando and Miguel, I asked them about 
how they identified and if they could tell me more about what that meant. As 
anthropologist Marisol de la Cadena has noted before, Latin American mestizaje is not a 
fixed political statement but rather “a terrain of political contestation and dialogic 
reformulation in which elite and grassroots intellectuals dispute meanings of identity 
labels and rights to equal citizenship.” (de la Cadena 2000, 318) The following 
formulations of mestizaje that I found in the interviews reflect this political contestation 
occurring on the Caribbean coast. In his discussion of mestizo costeño identity, Miguel 
emphasizes that the sense of belonging for the earlier wave of migrants and their families 
was not necessarily racialized, so much as it was spatialized. At the beginning of the 
interview when he elaborated on how he thought about mestizo costeño identity, Miguel 
began by explicitly stating the significance of space in understanding mestizo costeño 
identity: 
 
Aunque hablo español en la casa, hay un sentido de que somos distintos a otros 
mestizos del Pacífico del pais. It started as a joke that mestizos from Managua are 
a particular way and from Chontales are another way. Aquí estudiamos, aquí 
tenemos nuestros amigos, aquí tenemos la residencia, aquí tenemos a nuestra 
familia. Nos hace parte de una identidad mestiza, pero costeña. 
 
(Although I speak Spanish at home, there is a sense that we are different from 
other mestizos of the Pacific. It started as a joke that mestizos from Managua are a 
particular way and from Chontales are another way. We study here, we have our 
friends here, we have residence here, we have our families here. It forms part of 
our mestizo identity, but costeña.) 
Miguel is clear that the sense of social belonging is necessarily rooted in space due to the 
proximity to family and friends. Additionally, it is unclear whether he thinks that the 
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“sense” that mestizos living in the Caribbean coast are fundamentally different than 
mestizos living elsewhere, whether those differences are socially constructed or not. In 
other words, there is a “sense” of difference, but what is clearer is that mestizos living in 
the Caribbean coast have their social networks in the Coast and live in a different context 
than other mestizos do throughout Nicaragua. Orlando takes this one step further by 
linking this sense of spatial identity to his argument that mestizos costeños are 
discriminated against by mestizos in the Pacific. 
 Orlando’s narrative about anti-mestizo discrimination is built up by the following 
elements. When I first asked him about mestizos costeños, he first distinguished between 
the “national mestizo” and mestizos costeños. He explained the “national mestizo” is the 
archetypical mestizo subject in the Pacific whereas mestizos costeños live on the coast in 
a different reality than those in the Pacific. He says that mestizos costeños have 
  
“coexisted peacefully, suffering hard times and worse times, that is, we suffer the same 
that Creole mestizos, black Creoles, Rama Creoles- here everything is a mix. Here there 
is no one who can say I am 100% of a particular ethnicity.”  
“Hemos coexistidos pacificamente sufriendo las duras y las ma’duras, o sea lo mismo que 
sufre el Creole mestizo, el Creole negro, el Creole rama, aquí todo es una mezcla. Aquí 
no hay nadie que diga “yo soy 100% de tal etnia.” 
Here, he establishes two discursive elements. First, he flattens the differences between 
the suffering that different groups experience on the Caribbean coast when he says that 
“we suffer the same as Creole mestizos, black Creoles, Rama Creoles.” Such a claim flies 
in the face of extensive historical documentation that violence on the Caribbean coast is 
organized along racial lines, as Courtney Morris and Jennifer Goett have recently 
documented. (Morris 2016; Goett 2017) Then, he says that everyone is so mixed, that it is 
impossible to claim racial, cultural or ethnic purity. During the interview, this comment 
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was striking because it was an abstraction that he applied to all other groups on the coast 
while he was mostly discussing mestizo costeño identity.  
As I listened to the interview again, it became clear that this was an important 
discursive strategy in building up his argument about anti-mestizo discrimination. In the 
minutes that follow this point about racial purity, Orlando goes back and forth on his 
points about racial and cultural mixture. On the one hand, he maintains that there is such 
extensive intergroup marriages that being 100% of any group is impossible. On the other 
hand, he went on to say that on the coast some groups are easily recognizable. To make 
his point, he draws upon prevailing stereotypical narratives of Creoles by saying that if 
“you talk about the Maypole (it’s the dance of the Creoles), if you talk about rondón, they 
are the things that identify a person.” (“Si vos hablás de palo de mayo (es el baile de los 
criol), si hablás de rondon, son las cosas que identifican a una persona.”) Orlando reifies 
Creole group identity through these distinct features that other groups supposedly lack, or 
at least are denied in his account in this particular interview.  
In his description of Creoles, we find an important aspect of his argument of anti-
mestizo discrimination. He says that “although [Creoles] are not autochthonous, just like 
us who came later, they already have some permanence on this territory.” (“Aunque no 
son autoctonos, a lo igual que nosotros que vinieron después, ellos ya tienen tiempo de 
permanencia en este territorio.) Again, when Orlando says that neither Creoles nor 
mestizos costeños are autochthonous to the Caribbean coast, he is suggesting that their 
relationship to the territory is the same by flattening the differences between Creoles and 
mestizos costeños’ relationship to the land, the state, and the territory. This claim also 
misses historical works that have traced Creoles’ relationship to the territory for years. 
(Gordon 1998; Hooker 2010) Further, by his own admission that mestizos came in search 
of better economic opportunities whereas Creoles were there long before, the comparison 
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does not do the work he sets it up to do. Instead, the political work of this comparison is 
to erase the distinct historical trajectories that have been imbued with differential 
racialized power relations to position mestizos costeños and Creoles on the Caribbean 
coast as somehow having equal claim to the territory. 
The way Orlando links mestizo costeños, Creoles, and their relationship to the 
Caribbean coast reveals how closely linked race and land rights are within discourses of 
mestizo costeño identity in Bluefields. One of the important things to note here is that 
Orlando had not yet begun to focus his discussion on land rights. At the time, he was still 
describing mestizo costeño identity and the relationship between mestizos costeños and 
other groups on the coast. The narrative of anti-mestizo discrimination, or what Courtney 
Morris calls “mestizo victimhood,” works to position mestizos as experiencing a specific 
form of discrimination that other groups do not. Orlando’s discursive strategy is to flatten 
differences and power differentials between mestizos costeños and Creoles on the coast, s 
strategy that also works to establish an imagined relationship of equality on the 
Caribbean coast that becomes unsettled when Afro-descendant and indigenous 
communities protect their collectively owned land from mestizo occupation. This is more 
explicitly seen in the next set of discursive elements that are more specifically organized 
around ideas of land rights and autonomy.  
Mestizos Costeños and the Racial Politics of Regional Autonomy 
In the previous section I explored how Orlando and Miguel used ideas about 
mestizaje to articulate mestizo costeño identity. One of the reoccurring strategies I notice 
in Orlando’s narratives is forging a linkage between mestizo migration to the Caribbean 
coast and subsequent sanitized intergroup relationships. In this section, I explore how 
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mestizos costeños’ ideas about autonomy help us understand contemporary racial politics 
of land rights in Bluefields.  
Orlando begins to talk about autonomy by discussing the relationship between 
mestizos costeños and the coast. One of the quotes that most stands out at the beginning 
of this portion of his discussion is when he says mestizos costeños don’t have their own 
identity. About half an hour into his account of mestizo costeño identity and history, 
Orlando said that “costeño identity is what unites all the ethnicities. The one who truly 
makes use of all is the mestizo costeño because he doesn’t have his own identity.” (“La 
identidad costeña es lo que une todas las etnias. El verdadero que hace uso de todo es el 
mestizo costeño porque no tiene identidad propia.”) This statement continues to build on 
his earlier statements of racial and cultural mixture. Earlier in the interview when 
Orlando says that mestizos have so thoroughly integrated into the Caribbean coast that 
they have married with individuals of all racial groups, Orlando was beginning to build 
an argument of racial mixture that is reminiscent of Mexican thinker José Vasconcelos’ 
“cosmic race.” I think of Vasconcelos’ idea here because of the kind of work racial 
mixture does in Orlando’s narrative. In The Cosmic Race, Vasconcelos writes that 
European empires “committed the sin of destroying those races, while we assimilated 
them, and this gives us new rights and hopes for a mission without precedent in History.” 
(Vasconcelos 1997, 17) Here, Vasconcelos writes about race mixture as a way of 
justifying new rights to which mixed-race people are entitled. Orlando’s narrative uses 
the idea of racial mixture to suggest that mestizos costeños do not have their own identity 
in the way that other racial groups (ie: Creole, Garífuna, Rama, Sumu and Mayagna) 
have their own identities on the coast. Indeed, he goes as far as to suggest the mestizos 
costeños are the only ones who can unite these groups because they embody this mixture. 
He then links this notion of group unity to specific rights through the concept of 
 55 
autonomy. One of the clearer quotes in which he makes this linkage is when he shares 
that: 
We say that on the Caribbean coast we can do anything if we use the basic 
principle of autonomy: unity in diversity. But we have to be united on the issues 
of development and there is a serious problem there. 
 
(Decimos que la costa Caribe podemos hacer cualquier cosa si usamos un 
principio basico de la autonomia. La unidad en la diversidad. Pero tenemos que 
estar unidos en los temas de desarrollo y ahi esta un problema serio.)  
The topic of development projects has been a central issue for the Caribbean coast 
territories. Law 28 of the Nicaraguan constitution delineates the constitutional basis of 
regional autonomy and specifically discusses development as a central issue that the 
communities of the Caribbean coast must be able to lead for themselves. Thus, when 
Orlando says that “we have to be united on the issues of development,” he is not entirely 
wrong. As he frequently points out, many development projects have failed to benefit the 
communities of the Caribbean coast. In the past, he has resigned from positions with 
organizations and international projects when he has felt that they are not leading to 
sustainable progress for the coast, focusing instead on more generative projects. (Leon 
2009) However, development projects in Nicaragua have not always impacted all racial 
groups in the same way, often centering the needs of mestizos and rendering invisible the 
needs of Afro-descendant communities.  
When Orlando says that anything is possible on the coast through the “basic 
principle of autonomy,” he invokes unity as a discursive strategy to erase the divergent 
ways in which differentially racialized groups experience development projects. He 
expands on this linkage when he says that   
[The coast has] 90% of the resources, 50% of the territory, cultural 
diversity, but these policies don’t incentivize development, only extraction. 
Mestizos don’t escape that. Just because the rest of the country benefits from this 
doesn’t mean we do. ([La costa tiene] 90% de los recursos naturales, 50% del 
territorio, diversidad cultural, pero estas política no incentivize el desarrollo, solo 
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la extracción. Y los mestizos no se escapan de eso. Solo porque en el resto del 
pais se beneficia no quiere decir que nosotros también.) 
Here, he adds an important part of his narrative: that mestizos costeños do not benefit 
from certain projects the same way mestizos beyond the Caribbean coast do. He brings it 
all together in the following: 
When we go to the Pacific, they discriminate against us when they see we wear 
chains and have long hair. Then you return to your land and a black person, even 
if you’re related, will discriminate against you because of your ethnic condition, 
and saying you don’t have rights. Or you find a miskitu and says “You mestizos 
have nothing to do here.” Costeño identity has been lost and now it’s a conflict of 
interests along the lines of “I’m owner of this land and you have no rights here. 
I’m owner of the resources and you have no rights.” And we’ve eaten shit 
together. When it’s convenient for them, the autonomy process is a solution. 
When it’s convenient for them, they use the territorial governments or communal 
governments to make decisions but not to empower them. And when it’s not 
convenient, they don’t recognize them. The big loser is the mestizo costeño. If 
you talk with one or another ethnic group, they see us as invaders, as if we don’t 
have rights, the weed in society. The mestizo costeño is a worker, is out at sea, 
producing on land. There’s no difference. There are robbers in every ethnic group, 
good people and bad people. The more people there are, the more good people 
and the more bad people. 
 
(Cuando vamos al Pacífico, nos discriminan cuando ven que tengo cadena o pelo 
largo.  Y cuando venís a tu tierra, te encontras a un negro que te relacionaste y 
hasta sos familia, discriminandote por tu condición étnica y diciendo que vos no 
tenés derechos. O te encontrás con un Miskitu que viene y dice “Ustedes los 
mestizos no tienen nada que hacer aquí.” Identidad costeña se ha perdido, es 
conflicto de intereses: yo soy dueño de la tierra y vos aqui no tenes ningun 
derecho. Soy dueño de recursos y vos no tenes derechos. Y hemos comido mierda 
junto. Cuando les conviene el proceso de autonomia es una solucion. Cuando les 
conviene usan los gobiernos territoriales, a los gobiernos comunales para que 
tomen decision pero no les dan capacidades. Y cuando no, lo desconecen. El gran 
perdedor es el mestizo costeño. El mestizo costeño si vos hablas con uno u otra 
etnia nos ven como invasores, nos ven como que no tenemos derecho, la mala 
hierba dentro de la sociedad. El mestizo costeño es trabajador, anda en el mar, 
produce en la tierra. No hay ninguna diferencia. Hay ladrones en todas las etnias, 
hay gente buena y hay gente mala. Entre mas gente, mas gente mejor or peor.) 
This last quote captures what I found to be at the crux of his arguments regarding 
mestizo costeño history and identity. This quote reveals how Orlando makes the linkages 
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between mestizo migration and making claims to land rights through the autonomy 
process. Here he continues to expand the narrative of mestizo victimhood by arguing that 
mestizos costeños are discriminated against by multiple groups: not only mestizos in the 
Pacific, but also black and Miskitus (if not indigenous groups more broadly) on the 
Caribbean coast. Then, he explains that he feels that mestizos costeños are seen as 
“invaders” that don’t have rights on the coast, although he himself opened the interview 
by stating that mestizos costeños invaded the Caribbean coast, using the same word. A 
more important point to notice here is his quick turn from the all-encompassing notion of 
“rights” to the specific issue of land and resources.  
Throughout the interview, when Orlando discussed rights on the Caribbean coast, 
he almost always meant rights to own land. I interpret this as one of the social linkages 
that connects the discourse of mestizo costeños to the broader political forces and 
conditions on the coast. Afro-Caribbean and indigenous communities of the coast have 
struggled to protect their rights to the Caribbean coast territories, which they have lived 
on since before Nicaragua was even a nation. The forced military annexation of 1894 
incorporated the territory into the bounds of the nation while treating its Afro-descendant 
and indigenous residents as second-class citizens, a history that has been well excavated 
and traced by scholars but also local Creole leaders. (Gordon 1998; Hooker 2010; Hooker 
2012; Morris 2016; Goett 2017) Thus, this history of anti-black and anti-indigenous 
violence sanctioned and often led by the Nicaraguan state has not been kept secret or 
inaccessible. Instead, discourses like that of mestizo victimhood, reject this series of facts 
in favor of a fictionalized account in which past injustices were abruptly ended through 
intergroup marriage or cultural mixture. In this way, intergroup marriages, cultural 
mixture, and the inability to claim “pure” racial ancestry are all discursive elements that 
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work to obscure or erase the history of dispossession experienced by Afro-descendant 
and indigenous communities.  
Similarly, the idea of “inverted racism” captures this political orientation and 
work. If the claim of inverted racism (or the more commonly called reverse racism) is 
that Afro-descendants and/or indigenous communities have the collective power to 
oppress mestizos, then one important implication of this argument is that Afro-
descendants and/or indigenous communities have somehow obtained that collective 
power. Based on Orlando’s account, it would seem that his answer to this lies in Law 
445’s ability to grant communal land titles to Afro-Caribbean and indigenous 
communities of the Caribbean coast.  
This narrative of mestizos costeños is not the only one that emerged in the 
interviews, although it is certainly reflective of the prevailing ideas and logics I overheard 
in Bluefields during my time there. In taxi cabs, restaurants, stores, I tried to pay attention 
to how mestizos in Bluefields articulated themselves and their histories. Orlando’s 
narrative contains most of the elements and linkages that I heard time and time again. 
However, as Stuart Hall reminds us, the linkages are not necessary, absolute, pre-
determined or for all time. Instead, they are forged under specific conditions and for 
specific reasons. Some of the ideas in my other interviews help establish another 
possibility for thinking about mestizos costeños and their relationship to the Caribbean 
coast and its communities. 
“What do we do now?”: Alternative Linkages for Mestizo Costeño Discourse 
One significant difference between Orlando and Miguel’s articulations of mestizo 
costeño history and identity was their approach to land rights on the Caribbean coast. 
Orlando’s invocation of inverted racism presumed that other groups were encroaching 
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upon mestizos costeños’ rights to land. In contrast, Miguel’s account offers a different set 
of articulations and, therefore, another way to articulate mestizo costeño history and 
identity. Miguel said,  
The current Nicaraguan state is content not solving or addressing the basis of the 
conflict that is confronting poor peasants against indigenous communities, 
particularly this concerns who owns the land. How do the rules govern access to 
land and the activities held on that land? It seems to me that it’s been a long 
process that hasn’t stopped of continuous occupation of the coast by peasants and 
colonistas and some of them, more recent waves, without any titles or legal basis 
for this occupation. So its an uncontrolled occupation, promoted by the state, 
sometimes by omission and other times by policy. Clear to me that the state is not 
really concerned with stopping that process. I would say that implicit support for 
the occupation of the land on the coast has not changed the perception that the 
coast still has value in the eyes of the Nicaraguan. 
While Miguel recognizes that mestizos costeños are cash-poor, he also attributes 
responsibility to the state. Miguel describes recent mestizos costeños presence on the 
coast as a “continuous occupation of the coast by peasants and colonistas.” In describing 
these recent mestizo costeño migrants as “peasants and colonistas,” Miguel recognizes 
that they are both cash-poor while also violating the collective land rights of indigenous 
communities on the coast. Rather than presume that indigenous communities are 
violating or negating the rights of mestizos costeños whenever they protect their lands, 
Miguel articulates mestizo migration to an illegal occupation that is encouraged by the 
state. This linkage suggests a different set of political implications. 
   Miguel’s narrative recognizes that the state has a continued interest in unsettling 
the collective claims to land that Afro-descendant and indigenous communities have. 
This narrative highlights how the Nicaraguan state has a variety of ways in which it is 
complicit with mestizos costeños’ occupation of indigenous lands. In essence, Miguel is 
linking mestizo migration to broader land grabbing projects in Nicaragua. Geographer 
Sharlene Mollett offers a similar argument, claiming that colonial legacies of land 
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usurpation and land grabbing manifest in contemporary politics by shaping development 
projects throughout Central America’s Caribbean coast albeit in varying forms. (Mollett 
2016) This linkage, then, does not work to justify mestizo costeños’ illegal occupations 
of Afro-descendant and indigenous territories. Instead, it reveals how mestizos costeños 
are simultaneously economically disadvantaged while racially privileged enough to 
escape the legal consequences of violating the collectively held Afro-descendant and 
indigenous land. At the same time that mestizos costeños are being allowed to violate 
land laws, black youth on Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast are subject to surveillance and 
extrajudicial state violence, a violence that is both racialized and gendered. (Goett 2011; 
Goett 2017; Morris 2016) This discrepancy shows how the racial hierarchy in Nicaragua 
is preserved.  
 By way of conclusion, I return to some of the central questions about mestizos 
costeños. Much of the literature on race also delves into examining racial identity. This 
scholarship takes for granted that racial identity also reveals something about the political 
orientation or ideas that an individual (or collective) might have. However, this chapter 
shows that it is not always the case. Both Orlando and Miguel are clear that they identify 
as mestizos costeños. Both would say that mestizos costeños are mixed-race subjects that 
reside on Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast. And yet, their ideas about mestizo costeños and 
their politics on the coast are significantly different. In order words, their identity does 
not fully capture their politics. In order to answer the question about how mestizos 
costeños think about autonomy, the Caribbean coast and its other racial groups, it was 
necessary to think beyond how they might identify themselves racially and interrogate 
what their discourses about themselves and their history tell us about contemporary racial 
politics in Bluefields.   
 61 
This exercise in reading these two articulations of mestizo costeño history and 
identity was useful in making visible Stuart Hall’s point that the linkages in an 
articulation are unnecessary. However, I also want to recall Charles Hale’s approach in 
Más Que Un Indio. Hale was interested in providing an account of Guatemalan ladinos 
that did more than caricature them as villains in the drama of contemporary racial 
politics. At the end of Orlando’s interview, he began to ask what would come of this 
interview. “How do my people benefit? …What do we do now?” (“¿Cómo se beneficia 
mi gente? …¿Qué hacemos ahora?”) Many months after this interview, the idea of 
answering this question and defusing the time bomb that he used to describe 
contemporary racialized land politics in Bluefields feels far beyond the scope of this 
project. Instead, the next chapter explores what the implications of these discourses are 




Chapter 4:  Mestizos Costeños, Black Autonomy and the Potentials of 
Identity Politics in Liberal Projects 
For weeks after November 8, 2016, media outlets in the United States published 
op-eds and articles that examined the results of the 2016 presidential election. Most 
articles referenced identity politics during the candidates’ campaigns. Mark Lilla’s op-ed 
in The New York Times, “The End of Identity Liberalism,” was a particularly forceful 
indictment of identity politics, reflecting how many commentators felt after the outcome 
of the election. (Lilla 2016) The general line of critique claimed that the result of the 
election was a product of an obsessive focus on interests that are too narrowly-tailored to 
specific “identity groups,” such as the frequently discussed bathroom bills that emerged 
preventing trans people from using the bathrooms that correspond to their gender. Other 
articles focused on Hillary Clinton’s campaign for disingenuously pandering to multiple 
identity groups: too specific to reach large numbers, too disingenuous to garner true 
support, and too narrowly focused on people of color to reach the white majority.  
Both critiques and users of identity politics seemed to rely on the basic premise 
that identities matter in politics. Even those that critiqued it often did so by saying that 
Clinton’s loss was due to her disavowal of white, rural, low-income voters. Thus, while 
many political commentators and academics blamed the framework of identity politics 
for the outcome of the US Presidential election, they simultaneously reinforced it by 
using it to identify a group of people that was left unsatisfied with one political party and 
appeased by the populism of another. These analyses are all eager to examine and 
classify the electoral population with the goal of understanding the dynamics of which 
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group voted in which way. In doing so, these arguments take for granted that an identity 
category is also an identity group, a critique that sociologist Mara Loveman (1999) 
leverages when questioning why race is “essential.” Loveman’s critique is particularly 
apt as discourses of identity politics often center race in their conceptions of identity. My 
research in Bluefields and subsequent analysis suggest that there are more relevant 
questions waiting to be asked. 
The academic literature has explored the complex dynamics within a given 
identity group. Taking Latinos in the United States for example, social scientists have 
explored the widely divergent political and social experiences within the group called 
Latinos in the United States have, explaining why Dominicans in New York might have 
different political ideologies and practices than Cubans in Miami or Venezuelans in San 
Francisco.(Affigne, Hu-DeHart, and Orr 2014; Beltrán 2010; García Bedolla 2014) 
Indeed, this literature is so well-established that even articles in popular newspapers and 
magazines have examined the extent to which widely different trajectories from Latin 
America to the United States have shaped the politics of different national groups once 
they make it to the US. Both in the academy and in the mainstream media, we have been 
asking the same questions about identity politics for several decades. Instead, I suggest 
that a more relevant question would build on the work done by previous scholars and ask 
why and how identity matters. Put another way, what political work does identity 
perform in a given context?  
I conclude this thesis by exploring how the case of mestizos costeños in 
Bluefields helps us answer this question. I begin by interrogating the claims put forth 
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about “identity liberalism” and show how my project responds to that. I argue that the 
point is not merely to claim an identity, but rather to understand the political work that 
identities and their attendant discourses can do for the bodies that claim them. Then, I 
turn to the ideas posed by Dolene Miller and Nora Newball in our conversation and show 
how they reflect one possible iteration of what Charles Mills terms as “black radical 
liberalism.”  
Identity, Liberalism and Politics: Learning from Bluefields 
 The case of mestizos costeños in Bluefields provides a useful case study to think 
through the ideas put forth in many emerging critiques of identity as a part of 
contemporary politics. Lilla’s opinion piece in The New York Times claims that recent 
generations of voters, journalists, educators, and politicians in the United States have 
relied on identity as a lazy and inadequate way to form their politics while having 
“shockingly little to say about such perennial questions as class, war, the economy and 
the common good.” Thus, this first component of the critique of identity politics is that it 
is a deficient form of politics because it does not engage with the “perennial,” important 
questions that have historically preoccupied political thought. 
The second part of the critique reifies identity politics and reveals how essential it 
is. Lilla’s opinion piece is one of the clearer pieces to do this. In his op-ed he critiques the 
whitelash thesis in which he posits that the liberal interpretation of the election says that 
white voters transformed their economic disadvantage into racial rage, a “whitelash.” He 
does not offer an explanation for how millions of non-white voters that were also 
economically disadvantaged did not also connect in the same way to the politics of 
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“whitelash,” but instead reifies the object of his critique by limiting his analysis to one 
group. The explanation that he does offer is that these white, rural, economically 
disadvantaged voters were “not actually reacting against the reality of our diverse 
America,” but instead “reacting against the omnipresent rhetoric of identity.”  
 Lilla’s suggestion is to bring about the end of identity liberalism by drawing 
“from the past successes of pre-identity liberalism,” in other words, to make liberalism 
great again. He goes on to say that “such a liberalism would concentrate on widening its 
base by appealing to Americans as Americans and emphasizing the issues that affect a 
vast majority of them. It would speak to the nation as a nation of citizens who are in this 
together and must help one another.” This analytical move away from identity makes it 
impossible to begin grappling with the historical injustices that some groups have 
experienced in the United States. In the previous chapter, some of the discursive linkages 
that Orlando made achieve the same end.  
 This study of mestizos costeños in Bluefields reveals the political implications of 
identity in political discourses. In Bluefields, the linkage between mestizo migration and 
a harmonious racial present allows commentators to represent activists that focus on 
rupturing that discourse as if they are disrupting actual harmony. What black Creole 
activists like Nora Newball and Dolene Miller are doing is reiterating the historical and 
present conditions of black Creole communities, allowing us to see why an approach that 
does not begin with acknowledging these experiences will be an inadequate way forward.  
What my research on mestizos costeños shows is that, indeed, talking about identity is 
not enough. This is why activists that pursue identity politics do not simply present and 
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discuss their identities as if that was the only aspect of their politics. Instead, black 
women activists have used discourses of identity to map out their politics and articulate 
them to broader social, historical, and political questions. In this thesis, I chose Stuart 
Hall’s theory of articulation because it allowed me the analytical tools to make visible 
how identity is mobilized in political discourse in addressing the “perennial questions” 
that Lilla is concerned are left unattended if the starting point of a discussion is not rooted 
in comforting white citizens. In the case of mestizos costeños in Bluefields, I was able to 
find at least two ways in which mestizo costeño identity was linked to different political 
analyses despite being rooted in similar ideas about mestizo racial identity in Nicaragua’s 
Caribbean coast.  
In one articulation, mestizo costeño identity was a way to make claims to land 
rights. By establishing mestizos costeños as profoundly racially mixed as anyone else on 
the Caribbean coast could be, Orlando makes the argument that mestizos costeños should 
have rights to the land protected on the coast. This was the most commonly heard 
discourse among mestizos costeños, in which identity served to flatten differences in 
power and to obscure the injustices and violences done to Afro-descendants and 
indigenous communities on Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast. In a less commonly heard 
articulation, mestizo identity served to show how the Nicaraguan state had produced 
policies that had not only violated the rights of Afro-descendants and indigenous 
communities, but was now also including mestizo campesinos in the wake of its 
contemporary ambitions to stay connected to global capitalist projects. This second 
critique has the potential to reframe the effects of these global capitalist projects and 
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show how despite being racially privileged and maintaining the complicity of the state, 
mestizos costeños experienced the economic pressure that these projects place onto the 
masses in the global South, economic pressures that Afro-descendant and indigenous 
communities have felt, navigated, and protested for decades. Given that these 
articulations exist simultaneously with different orientations, they show Hall’s point that 
articulations need not exist in a specific form even when they are made under the same 
conditions. I suggest that they also show the potential for political projects that 
philosopher Charles Mills calls “black radical liberalism,” forms that also address the 
perennial questions mentioned above while beginning with the experiences of black 
Creole communities.  
Black Autonomy & Black Radical Liberalism 
In Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism, Mills offers a 
critique of the way liberalism has been practiced thus far. (Mills 2017) He suggests that 
what has been practiced has been a form of liberalism that has privileged whites and 
whiteness while exploiting people of color and justifying the multiple forms of violence 
enacted against them through global white supremacy. Mills critiques theorists of justice, 
especially John Rawls, who present ideal theory as a tool sufficiently able to deal with the 
historical injustices that Mills lists and which hundreds of scholars have traced in 
excruciating detail. In response to these ideal theories of justice, Mills concludes that if 
the point is to work towards any meaningful idea of justice, then black radical liberalism 
may be a more productive way forward. 
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Mills theorizes black radical liberalism as a political philosophy that is 
“responsive to the realities of black diasporic experiences in modernity” as a way of 
reorganizing and transforming liberal politics. (203) As such, Mills offers that a black 
radical liberalism must recognize white supremacy as a constitutive element of liberalism 
in the United States as a way to begin transforming that system into one that can benefit 
black Americans as well. Extending this idea to Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast, I interpret 
the project of black autonomy as one potential form of black radical liberalism. 
During my initial conversation with Nora Newball and Dolene Miller, one of the 
central themes that emerged was their awareness of the extensive role the Nicaraguan 
state has in shaping the lives of costeños. While there are certainly active ways in which 
the state can shape their experiences, such as fulfilling its duty to title the collectively 
held Afro-descendant and indigenous lands, there are also the less visible ways, such as 
when it refuses to arrest mestizos costeños that illegally occupy these lands. During my 
conversation with Newball and Miller at the beginning of the project, one of the aspects 
that most struck me, then, was their desire to engage with a state that has historically 
disavowed Afro-descendants on the Caribbean coast. “We’re not asking for more than 
what the law give us nor for more than what our rights give us, nor more than history 
recognizes,” Miller explained. Miller and Newball recounted a history that traced how the 
Nicaraguan state had historically used land grabs to transform communally held lands 
into national lands that could then be privatized and sold for profit. In recognition of that 
historical relationship, Newball and Miller contend that “the only way [forward] is for 
Nicaragua to recognize our rights and let us live in peace.” Newball and Miller both 
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discussed the rights that the National Assembly guaranteed to their collectively held land. 
Their analysis recognizes the way the mestizo nation-state has violated the very laws they 
have passed and, in recognition of that, they are demanding that the government follow 
its own laws. I read this approach to politics as an example of the kind of black radical 
liberalism that Mills suggests while keeping in mind that it might depart in some ways. 
One key point in thinking about black autonomy on the Caribbean coast as a form 
of black radical liberalism is figuring out how white supremacy figures into theorizing 
this strand of Afro-Latin American political thought. In his epilogue, Mills says that a 
black radical liberalism would begin by recognizing how white supremacy has been 
constitutive of (racial) liberalism in the United States. In thinking through a black radical 
liberalism in Nicaragua, I would say that it’s important to also take into consideration 
how projects complicit with white supremacy have also shaped the trajectory of 
racialized violence. As racial subjects, mestizos in Nicaragua and mestizos costeños more 
specifically are clear that they identify as racially mixed subjects. One important 
component of the articulations I traced in chapter 3 was that mestizos costeños are 
fundamentally mixed-race mestizos. Orlando’s narrative goes to significant lengths to 
establish that mestizos costeños are anything but a single race. In another interview, Doña 
Luisa recounted an extensive family history in which she included mestizo, Afro-
descendant and indigenous background. As such, mestizos costeños and mestizos 
elsewhere in Nicaragua are not necessarily located in a social position of whiteness. 
Recognizing that their social position is not necessarily one of whiteness allows us to 
explore how non-white racial subjects can still produce and align themselves with anti-
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black and anti-indigenous politics and practices. As such, whiteness and whiteness 
studies may not be the most useful way to understand racial domination in a context in 
which whiteness is not a part of the intellectual and political genealogy of race in which 
these politics develop. This isn’t to say that white supremacy is not present, but rather to 
suggest that it isn’t the only or most useful way in which to understand anti-black and 
anti-indigenous politics. In the case of Bluefields and throughout Nicaragua, thinking 
about anti-black and anti-indigenous politics beyond only whites allows us to see how 
other actors can be complicit with these racial projects, allowing what Mills calls “racial 
liberalism” to continue enacting violence and exploitation into Afro-diasporic 
communities well into the 21st century. As such, by expanding the ways in which we 
might make sense of anti-black and anti-indigenous political projects, we can also begin 
to formulate an articulation that can begin to more directly address them and work 
towards a more just future by being more aware of the multiple ways in which violence 
has worked. 
This kind of political project, however, would require the collaboration of 
mestizos costeños. For decades, mestizos costeños have been the majority group in 
Bluefields and throughout the Caribbean coast. (Hooker 2009; Hooker 2010; Morris 
2012) As such, their interpretation and contribution to local and regional politics has 
enormous implications for the future of black autonomy and any attempt at racial justice 
on the coast. A central impetus for this project was trying to explore what kind of ideas 
about race, justice, land, and autonomy mestizos costeños have in Bluefields. Along the 
way, one important question that simmered under the surface was if this was a new group 
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of people that have recently emerged in some way or if this was a new way in which an 
existing group was expressing itself. Taking into consideration the discourse that I found 
in my interviews and my interactions during six weeks in the summer of 2016, I suggest 
that the latter idea seems to best capture what I observed. The men and women that 
shared their time and ideas with me were very clear that their families have been on the 
coast longer than the terminology of “mestizo costeño.” Any remaining doubt I have 
about this would come from an argument regarding the role of phenomenological 
approach to understanding the emergence of a group. My impression from my 
interactions and in reviewing interview audio, is that mestizos costeños today would not 
fundamentally delink themselves from mestizos living on the coast in previous years and, 
in fact, trace their history and identity to mestizos who lived on the coast in previous 
years or decades but did not necessarily identify as “mestizos costeños.” One important 
complication to this is the continuing migration of mestizos into the coast since their 
identity and politics are likely different from mestizos that have lived on the coast all or 
most of their lives, while still having the opportunity to significantly impact the 
development of politics and projects for autonomy. This constitutes a potential agenda for 
future research. 
The intellectual contributions of black Creole women leaders like Nora Newball 
and Dolene Miller provide important interventions in thinking about the currently 
existing project of regional autonomy. The discourses produced by mestizos costeños 
allow us to begin to understand how this ever-growing group understands its relationship 
both to Creoles in Bluefields and to the Nicaraguan state. These various accounts of 
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history and politics directly engage the “perennial questions” of class, economics, justice, 
and education. That much is evident to anyone willing to take their ideas seriously. What 
I hope this thesis makes clear is that while there is plenty of violence that has been done 
in the past, there is nothing “necessary, determined, absolute or essential for all time” that 
should prevent us from ending that violence. Keeping this in mind, I return to the 
question Orlando posed to me at the end of our interview: “What do we do now?” 
Mills’ ideas about a black radical liberalism have been helpful in tying together 
the promise of racial articulations and the reality that multiple groups are experiencing in 
Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast today. Visions for justice on the coast would have to grapple 
with the historical record of anti-black and anti-indigenous violence, while also 
considering how the Nicaraguan state has had a hand in producing the displacement of 
mestizos throughout the Pacific and central regions of the country. Likewise, it would 
also need to take into account that violence has come from more than one source and that 
the kind of power that different groups have had has been profoundly unequal, requiring 
all groups to articulate a politics that can grapple with this history while recognizing their 
multiple positions, privileges, and relationship to power. If the goal is to move towards 
any form of justice, then identity politics is an indispensable tool in making visible how 
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